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ABSTRACT 
This Article explores a path in international law for recognizing 
the right of the Palestinian population of the West Bank to Israeli 
citizenship, based on the annexationist policies of Israel in the West 
Bank.  The scope of the obligation of states to confer citizenship on 
individuals is determined by international human rights law 
(“IHRL”).  The Article shows that a plausible reading of the IHRL 
treaty obligations of Israel suggests that it has a duty to grant 
citizenship to individuals born in its territory, who would otherwise 
be stateless, and that most West Bank Palestinians are currently 
considered stateless.  Therefore, if a given area of the West Bank is 
considered to have become part of Israel, most Palestinians 
subsequently born in such territory are plausibly entitled to receive 
Israeli citizenship as a matter of treaty law.  There also seems to be a 
broad, emerging right under customary international law of the 
residents of a territory acquired by a state to receive the citizenship 
of that state, regardless of whether or not they would otherwise be 
considered stateless.  
The West Bank is a territory under Israeli occupation, and 
annexation by an occupier of any part of the occupied territory 
violates international law.  The Article argues, however, that the 
illegal annexation by Israel of an occupied territory would make that 
territory a part of Israel for the limited purpose of the right to 
citizenship, as an exception to the principle that illegal annexation is 
null and void.  Hence, the existing and emerging IHRL obligations 
of Israel to grant citizenship to residents of territory acquired by 
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Israel extend to Palestinians residing in areas of the West Bank 
illegally annexed by Israel.  
The Article argues further that, for the purpose of applying the 
norms of IHRL that concern the right to citizenship, the definition of 
annexation extends beyond formal annexation and encompasses de 
facto annexation as well.  Annexation of occupied territory results 
from the occupier’s display of sovereignty in that territory, among 
other things, by settling its own population in the occupied territory.  
In view of the current spread of Israeli settlements across the West 
Bank, unless Israel removes, within a reasonable time period, many 
of these settlements, the entire territory of the West Bank may be 
considered to have been annexed, and the entire Palestinian 
population of the West Bank would have a strong claim to Israeli 
citizenship under an emerging norm of international law.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2019, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, 
declared his intention to promote the formal annexation of parts of 
the West Bank, a territory occupied by Israel since 1967. 1   The 
planned annexation would encompass many or all Israeli 
settlements located in the West Bank, but would not include 
Palestinian urban areas.2  In August 2020, Israel agreed to suspend 
its plan of formal annexation in order to normalize relations with the 
United Arab Emirates.3  The length of the announced suspension, 
and whether the annexation plan is carried out eventually, remains 
unclear.  If it happens, formal annexation would merely be the 
culmination of five decades of Israeli annexationist policies 
throughout the West Bank, manifest in the enterprise of Israeli 
settlements in this territory.4  Much like the formal annexation plans, 
the settlement enterprise generally targets territories outside 
Palestinian population centers.5 
 
 1 Andrew Carey, Netanyahu Says Israel Will Annex Parts of West Bank if He is Re-
Elected, CNN (Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/10/world/netanyahu-israel-west-bank-jordan-
valley/index.html [https://perma.cc/H4K8-G538]; Oliver Holmes, Netanyahu 
Vows to Annex Jewish Settlements in Occupied West Bank, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/07/netanyahu-vows-to-annexe
-jewish-settlements-in-occupied-west-bank [https://perma.cc/2P45-CCGJ]. 
 2 Oliver Holmes, Israel Signs Historic Deal with UAE that Will ‘Suspend’ West 
Bank Annexation, GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/13/israel-and-uae-to-form-dip
lomatic-ties-says-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/8RWK-QKH6] (citing a 
statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu regarding his intention to promote the 
annexation of all Israeli settlements in the West Bank).  Formal annexation may also 
extend to the Jordan Valley (an area amounting to roughly twenty-two percent of 
the territory of the West Bank).  See Carey, supra note 1; Data on Netanyahu’s Jordan 
Valley Annexation Map, PEACE NOW (Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://peacenow.org.il/en/data-on-netanyahus-jordan-valley-annexation-map 
(citing Prime Minister Netanyahu’s claim that no Palestinian would be annexed to 
Israel as a result of the planned annexation of the Jordan Valley). 
 3 Holmes, supra note 2.  
 4 See discussion of the settlement enterprise, infra Part IV.a. 
 5 A report by B’tselem, an Israeli human rights NGO, observes that the Oslo 
Accords, concluded between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, 
divided the West Bank into three areas based on demographic considerations.  The 
report proceeds to note that: 
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While treating much of the occupied West Bank as its own,6 
Israel has excluded the Palestinian population of this territory from 
its citizenry.  Commentators have observed that the integration of 
West Bank territories into Israel through the settlements enterprise, 
coupled with the allocation of the benefits attached to Israeli 
citizenship only to Israel’s own nationals but not to West Bank 
Palestinians, gives rise to flagrant discrimination that is tantamount 
to “the de facto institutionalization of Apartheid of some sort,” 7 
turning the occupation regime into one that “resembles a form of 
colonial regime.”8 
This Article examines whether the annexationist policies of 
Israel in the West Bank have given rise, or will give rise in the near 
future, to a right of West Bank Palestinians to Israeli citizenship.  
This inquiry concerns mainly the vast majority of the Palestinian 
population of the West Bank, residing in urban areas that are not 
targeted by the settlement policy of Israel or by its plans of formal 
annexation. 
The scope of the obligation of a state to confer citizenship on 
individuals is determined by international human rights law 
(“IHRL”). 9   Insofar as existing and emerging norms of IHRL 
recognize such an obligation, it is largely premised on a territorial 
 
Under this division densely populated Palestinian areas were designated 
Areas A and B and then handed over— . . . merely on paper—to the full 
or partial control of the Palestinian Authority.  These areas are non-
contiguous, constituting 165 ‘islands’ scattered across the West Bank.  The 
rest of the land, constituting some 60% of the West Bank, was designated 
Area C and remained under full Israeli control.  Area C is contiguous and 
includes all Israeli settlements . . . . 
Conquer and Divide: The Shattering of Palestinian Space by Israel, B’TSELEM (2018), 
https://conquer-and-divide.btselem.org/map-en.html [https://perma.cc/G5N9-
P7Q6].  Israeli settlement enclaves within Palestinian urban areas exist only in East 
Jerusalem, which has been formally annexed by Israel, and in the Palestinian city of 
Hebron. See Settlements, B’TSELEM (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://www.btselem.org/settlements [https://perma.cc/J6FX-FU4P]. 
 6 See discussion of Israeli policies of integrating large parts of the West Bank 
into Israel, infra Part IV.a.  
 7  Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal Occupation: 
Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 551, 600 (2005); see 
also John Dugard & John Reynolds, Apartheid, International Law, and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 867, 912 (2013). 
 8 Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 586. 
 9 See discussion infra Part II.b. 
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link between the state and the individual.10  The legal literature and 
the U.N. International Law Commission (“ILC”) examined the 
application of these norms to the residents of a territory acquired by 
a state in the course of state succession. 11   Situations of state 
succession include four modes of legal acquisition of territory, 
namely “transfer of part of the territory, unification of States, 
dissolution of a State and separation of part of the territory.”12 
Yet, applying the norms of IHRL on citizenship to the 
relationship between Israel and West Bank Palestinians, based on 
the annexationist policies of Israel in the West Bank, is by no means 
straightforward.  The West Bank is a territory under Israeli 
occupation.13  While situations of state succession concern the lawful 
acquisition of territory by a state, the unilateral annexation by an 
occupier of any part of the occupied territory violates international 
law.14  Such annexation is deemed by international law to be null 
and void,15 and attaching to it any legal effect would stand in tension 
with this principle.  Moreover, with the exception of East Jerusalem, 
the annexationist policies of Israel have not taken the form of formal 
annexation of West Bank territories, and such formal measure, if 
pursued in the future, is likely to exclude those parts of the West 
Bank populated by the bulk of the Palestinian population.16 
The inquiry into whether, and to what extent, international law 
supports a claim by West Bank Palestinians to Israeli citizenship is 
threefold.  First, this Article examines the scope of the obligation of 
Israel under IHRL to grant citizenship to the residents of a territory 
that is deemed by international law to have become part of Israel.  
This Article shows that a plausible reading of the IHRL treaty 
obligations of Israel in matters of citizenship suggests that Israel is 
 
 10 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-First Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/10, at 29 (Apr. 3, 1999) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on Nationality], 
https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_54_10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CKJ4-VWWH]. 
 11 See id; see also discussion infra Part II.b. 
 12 ILC Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, at 23. 
 13  See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 78 (July 9). 
 14 See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
 15 S.C. Res. 478, ¶¶ 2-3 (Aug. 20, 1980); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 58-60 (2009). 
 16 See sources cited supra note 2. 
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obligated to grant citizenship to individuals born in its territory, 
who would otherwise be stateless.  The Article further demonstrates 
that most West Bank Palestinians are currently considered stateless.  
Therefore, if a given area of the West Bank is considered to have 
become part of Israel, most Palestinians subsequently born in such 
territory are plausibly entitled to receive Israeli citizenship as a 
matter of treaty law.  In the case of legal annexation of territory by a 
state, there also seems to be an emerging right under customary 
international law of the residents of the annexed territory to receive 
the citizenship of the annexing state, regardless of whether or not 
such individuals would otherwise be considered stateless.  The 
Article concludes, however, that this emerging customary right is 
yet to consolidate as lex lata. 
Second, the Article examines whether the norms of IHRL on the 
right to citizenship in the case of lawful annexation also extend to 
the residents of territory that has been illegally annexed by Israel.  In 
other words, would the illegal annexation by Israel of the West Bank 
make that territory a part of Israel for the purpose of the right to 
citizenship? 
The Article shows that international law has recognized a 
limited human rights exception to the principle that an illegal 
annexation is null and void.  The interests underlying this principle 
must, at times, be balanced against human rights, and the contours 
of this balancing have been delineated by international 
jurisprudence.  Based on this jurisprudence, the Article concludes 
that the norms of IHRL on the right to citizenship, which apply to 
situations of state succession, extend to the case of illegal annexation 
as well.  In other words, an occupied territory unlawfully annexed 
by the occupier may be viewed as part of the occupier’s territory for 
the limited purpose of the right to citizenship.  This conclusion 
suffices to determine that the obligations of Israel under the norms 
of IHRL on the right to citizenship apply, at the very least, to 
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, a territory that has been 
formally annexed by Israel.17 
Third, the Article explores the concept of de facto annexation in 
relation to the question of citizenship.  Should parts of the West Bank 
be considered, for the purpose of recognizing the right of Palestinian 
residents of these territories to Israeli citizenship, a part of Israel 
 
 17 See discussion infra Part III.b. 
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based on a doctrine that extends the concept of annexation beyond 
formal annexation to encompass de facto annexation as well?  The 
Article answers this question in the affirmative, arguing that states 
must not be allowed to evade their human rights obligations by 
resorting to formal representations that do not reflect reality 
regarding the status of a territory. 
Commentators have pointed to “the doctrinal hole in the part of 
international law governing annexation,” 18  which lacks “any 
existing legal test for identifying an annexation where the matter is 
unclear and in dispute.”19  The Article reviews the various possible 
tests for the existence of de facto annexation proposed by 
international jurisprudence and by the literature.  For the purpose 
of the right to citizenship, the Article advances the display of 
sovereignty test for the existence of annexation, which brings 
together formal annexation and de facto annexation.  The test is 
satisfied by the occupier’s continuous exercise in the occupied 
territory of governmental functions that are typically reserved to a 
sovereign.  In other words, the occupier’s treatment of the occupied 
territory as its own.  The clearest form of such a display of 
sovereignty is the full extension by the occupier of its legal and 
administrative systems to the occupied territory, which is the 
distinguishing mark of formal annexation. 20   Yet, the occupier’s 
treatment of the occupied territory as its own, which satisfies the 
display of sovereignty test for annexation, may also take the form of 
the settlement by the occupier of its own population within the 
occupied territory, large-scale infrastructure projects aimed at 
supporting such settlement activity, and a partial extension of the 
occupier’s own legal system to the occupied territory.  Reviewing 
the enterprise of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the legal 
regime applied to it by Israel, the Article demonstrates that Israeli 
displays of sovereignty in the West Bank amount to annexation. 
What is the territorial scope of this annexation?  The main 
challenge in the application of the display of sovereignty test for 
annexation concerns efforts on the part of the occupier to design the 
 
 18 Joshua Kleinfeld, Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether International 
Law is Law, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2498 (2010); see also Omar M. Dajani, Israel’s 
Creeping Annexation, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 51, 52 (2017-2018). 
 19 Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 2495. 
 20 See infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text. 
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map of annexation in accordance with demographic considerations.  
Israeli displays of sovereignty in the West Bank, manifest in the 
settlement enterprise, typically target territories outside Palestinian 
population centers,21 as do plans to formally annex parts of the West 
Bank.22  Does the scope of annexation extend to population centers 
within the occupied territory that are not the object of the occupier’s 
annexationist policies, when the occupier aims to tailor its 
annexation of occupied territory around, and to the exclusion of, 
such population centers to advance a “maximum land, minimum 
population” annexation formula?   
The Article maintains that the principle of legality in 
international law and the right to self-determination support an 
argument against allowing an occupier to pick and choose densely 
populated areas within the occupied territory that the occupier 
would exclude from the realm of annexation and thereby from the 
sway of the right to citizenship.  Therefore, displays of sovereignty 
by the occupier in large parts of the occupied territory, in the form 
of formal annexation, settlement activity, or otherwise, may give rise 
also to annexation of other areas of the occupied territory, which are 
not targeted by the occupier’s annexationist policies.  In view of the 
current web of Israeli settlements across the West Bank, the 
proposed test for annexation leads to the conclusion that unless 
Israel removes, within a reasonable time, many of the settlements, 
the entire territory of the West Bank will be considered to have been 
annexed by Israel for the purpose of applying the norms of IHRL to 
a claim by West Bank Palestinians to Israeli citizenship. 
Some international lawyers rely on the notion of illegal 
occupation as the preferred legal avenue for dismantling the type of 
colonial regime established in the West Bank.23  Illegal occupation 
gives rise to a duty of the occupier to withdraw from the occupied 
 
 21 See sources cited supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 22 See Data on Netanyahu’s Jordan Valley Annexation Map, supra note 2. 
 23  See Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 605 (noting that the 
actions of Israel in the West Bank “amount to a de facto annexation of large portions 
of the occupied territory,” and that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank is 
therefore illegal).  Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michaeli caution that “[t]he law of 
occupation may indeed pave the way for a kind of apartheid, but only to the extent 
that it will be interpreted as excluding the notion of illegal occupation.”  Id. at 611, 
n. 327.  
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territory immediately and unconditionally.24  International law has 
long recognized the illegality of an occupation that was created by 
an unlawful use of force by the occupier.25  An emerging approach 
among commentators holds that an occupation resulting from a 
lawful use of force by the occupier—in self-defense (“lawfully 
created occupation”)—may also become illegal.26  Proponents of this 
approach argue that the illegality of an occupation regime stems 
from the unreasonable prolongation by the occupier of the 
occupation. 27   Arguments that such conduct on the part of the 
occupier renders the occupation illegal have largely focused on the 
occupation of the West Bank by Israel, which, by most accounts, 
resulted from the lawful use of force by Israel.28 
The view that a lawfully created occupation may subsequently 
become illegal is highly disputed in the literature29 and does not find 
 
 24 Yael Ronen, Illegal Occupation and Its Consequences, 41 ISR. L. REV. 201, 228 
(2008). 
 25 See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, at 123 (Oct. 24, 1970) (“The territory of a State 
shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in 
contravention of the provisions of the [U.N.] Charter.”); see also Ariel Zemach, Can 
Occupation Resulting from a War of Self-Defense Become Illegal?, 24 MINN. J. INT’L L. 
313, 323-24 (2015). 
 26 Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 557; EYAL BENVENISTI, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 16-17 (2d ed. 2012); ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 55, 99 (1995); Ronen, supra note 
24, at 210, 218. 
 27 BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 245-47; Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra 
note 7, at 592-94, 597-605 (pointing to a “reasonable time” limit on the duration of 
occupation). 
 28  See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 206-207 
(2011); THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS 
AND ARMED ATTACKS 104-05 (2002); CASSESE, supra note 26, at 131; GEOFFREY R. 
WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN 
PEACE AGREEMENTS 30 (2000); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: 
BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 20-21 (1988); Michael P. Scharf, Clear and 
Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban on Biological and Chemical Weapons 
Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminalization, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 477, 491-92 
(1999). 
 29 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 2 (“A . . . myth surrounding the legal 
regime of belligerent occupation is that it is, or becomes in time, inherently illegal 
under international law.”); Michael Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 464-65 (1991) (“Israel is legally entitled to remain in the territory 
it now holds and to protect its security interests therein until new boundaries are 
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sufficient support in state practice.30  Moreover, the significance of 
the illegality of occupation as a legal vehicle for facilitating the end 
of occupation, and thereby the termination of an occupier’s 
annexationist policies, is diminished once the factual integration of 
the occupied territory into the occupying state is so deeply 
entrenched that it cannot realistically be reversed.  Indeed, the 
purpose of an occupier’s annexationist policies is to create such 
factual reality. 
The notion of illegal occupation and a theory that links the 
annexation of an occupied territory to a right of its residents to the 
citizenship of the occupying state are competing ideas.  The former 
concerns the end of occupation, and as a corollary, the termination 
of any formal or de facto annexation; the latter concerns the 
enjoyment of the fruits of annexation by residents of the occupied 
territory.  Setting aside the controversy about whether or not a 
lawfully created occupation may become illegal, this Article 
explores the path in international law for recognizing a right of the 
residents of an occupied territory to the citizenship of the occupying 
state on the basis of annexation. 
Part II of this Article discusses the significance of the right to 
citizenship.  Unless otherwise indicated, the terms “citizenship” and 
“nationality” are used throughout the Article synonymously.31  Part 
II also elaborates on the scope of the obligations of Israel, under 
existing and emerging norms of IHRL, to grant citizenship to 
individuals residing in its territory, particularly following the 
acquisition of territory by Israel.  Part III shows that such obligations 
extend to Palestinians residing in occupied territories illegally 
 
drawn in a peace settlement.”); Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of International Law in the 
Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1970) (“[T]here is 
nothing in either the [U.N.] Charter or general international law which leads one to 
suppose that military occupation, pending a peace treaty, is illegal.”); see generally 
Zemach, supra note 25, at 313 (arguing that the notion of illegal occupation in 
international law does not extend to occupation resulting from the lawful use of 
force by a state in self-defense). 
 30 Zemach, supra note 25, at 326-334 (demonstrating that international practice 
does not sufficiently support the existence of a rule of customary international law 
providing that a prolonged occupation resulting from a lawful use of force may 
become illegal). 
 31 Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 694, 
717 (2011) (noting that many commentators consider “nationality” and 
“citizenship” interchangeable). 
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annexed by Israel.  Part IV reviews Israeli policies of integrating 
parts of the occupied West Bank into Israel, which so far have not 
taken the form of formal annexation.  Part IV argues that, for the 
purpose of applying the norms of IHRL concerning the right to 
citizenship, the definition of annexation extends beyond formal 
annexation and encompasses de facto annexation.  Part IV identifies 
the appropriate test for the existence of annexation and applies it to 
the occupied West Bank. 
II. THE RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
a. The Significance of Citizenship 
The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) described nationality 
as a “legal bond” between an individual and a particular state.32  
Commentators have identified two core consequences of nationality 
under customary international law.  First, a state has a discretionary 
right, but not an obligation, to provide diplomatic protection to its 
nationals, that is, “to intervene on behalf of its own nationals if their 
rights are violated by another state for the purpose of obtaining 
redress.” 33   Second, a state has a duty to admit and readmit its 
nationals into its territory and allow them to reside therein.34 
Alice Edwards observed that beyond diplomatic protection and 
the duty of states to admit their citizens, “there is no agreed 
substantive minimum content of nationality as a matter of 
international law, not least because it turns so heavily on conditions 
and rules in the state of nationality.”35  According to Edwards, the 
right to nationality in international law is primarily a “procedural 
right, covering rights and rules relating to nationality acquisition 
 
 32 Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6). 
 33 Alice Edwards, The Meaning of Nationality in International Law in an Era of 
Human Rights: Procedural and Substantive Aspects, in NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 30-31 (Alice Edwards & Laura Van Waas eds., 2014); 
see also P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-44 (2d 
ed. 1979) (discussing the right of states to provide diplomatic protection to their 
nationals). 
 34 Edwards, supra note 33, at 30, 35-38; WEIS, supra note 33, at 45-49. 
 35 Edwards, supra note 33, at 42. 
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and deprivation,”36 whereas “the substantive content of ‘citizenship’ 
will depend to a large extent on one’s country of citizenship.”37 
Edwards’s observation may be accurate with respect to 
customary international law.  Yet, treaty law that is binding on Israel 
entitles citizens, but not others, to the most important aspects of 
political participation.  Article 25 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) provides that every citizen has 
the right to “take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives[,]” vote in elections for the 
governing institutions of the state, and stand for election to such 
institutions.38  This provision also entitles citizens to have access to 
public service. 39   Article 25 stipulates that these rights must be 
secured for all citizens without “unreasonable restrictions” or 
discrimination based on any status.40 
The substantive significance of citizenship in international law 
also stems from the general human rights law principle of non-
discrimination, enshrined in numerous human rights instruments41 
and considered a norm of customary international law.42  As stated, 
among others, in Article 26 of the ICCPR, this norm provides that:   
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without 
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this 
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, 
 
 36 Id. at 16 (internal quotations omitted). 
 37 Id. at 14. 
 38 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 39 Id. at 179. 
 40 Id.; see also id. at 173-74 (prohibiting discrimination based on any status in 
the application of the rights recognized in the ICCPR). 
 41 See, e.g., European Convention on Nationality art. 5(2), Nov. 6, 1997, 37 
I.L.M. 44.; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 211; ICCPR, supra note 38, 999 U.N.T.S. 
at 179; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2 (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 42 See Steven D. Jamar, The International Human Right to Health, 22 S.U. L. REV. 
1, 25 (1994) (“The right of non-discrimination and the right of equality are so well 
enshrined in all human rights conventions as to be an indisputable part of 
customary international human rights law.”). 
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sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.43 
Applied to citizenship status, the principle of non-
discrimination entails that “[a]s a citizen/national, an individual is 
recognized as a full member of the state, with all its attendant rights 
and obligations to be enjoyed in full equality and without 
discrimination.”44  T.H. Marshall described citizenship as “a status 
bestowed on those who are full members of a community.  All who 
possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with 
which the status is endowed.”45 
The relationship between citizenship and the principle of non-
discrimination, therefore, makes the former “the threshold through 
which individuals gain rights.”46  Chief Justice Warren’s description 
of citizenship as the “right to have rights”47 is only partially accurate 
when it comes to international human rights law, as there are 
fundamental human rights that a state must secure for individuals 
within its jurisdiction regardless of citizenship.48  There is, however, 
a bundle of rights that, under international human rights law, flow 
from citizenship by virtue of the principle of non-discrimination, in 
that if the state grants them to some of its citizens it must extend 
them to all its citizens.  Hence, in addition to political rights and the 
rights of entry and residence, citizenship status may bear on a range 
of social and economic rights, including the right to own property, 
the right to work, and the right to receive economic benefits afforded 
by the government only to citizens.49 
 
 43 ICCPR, supra note 38, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179. 
 44 Edwards, supra note 33, at 38. 
 45 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 
3, 18 (T.H. Marshall & Tom Bottomore eds., 1992). 
 46 David M. Howard, Analyzing the Causes of Statelessness in Syrian Refugee 
Children, 52 TEX. INT’L L. J. 281, 286 (2017). 
 47 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958). 
 48 See Edwards, supra note 33, at 40 (“[W]hile international human rights law 
articulates the basic rights all persons are entitled to enjoy, regardless of their 
nationality, there are still some key rights linked to nationality.”). 
 49 See Edwards, supra note 33, at 40 (noting that “rights to economic, social and 
cultural advancement” are generally associated with citizenship); Carol A. 
Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status, 10 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 156, 159 (1998) (“Failure to acquire status under the law can have a 
negative impact on many important elements of life, including the right to vote, to 
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b. The Right to Acquire Citizenship 
i. Traditional International Law 
The traditional approach followed by international law in 
matters of nationality, stated in Oppenheim’s International Law, 
held that “it is not for international law but for the internal law of 
each state to determine who is, and who is not, to be considered its 
national.”50   This view was affirmed by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in its advisory opinion concerning the Tunis 
and Morocco Nationality Decrees, which noted that “in the present 
state of international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion 
of the Court, in principle within this reserved domain [of state 
discretion].”51  This approach also prevailed with regard to the legal 
consequences of state succession.52 
The deference of traditional international law to state discretion 
in matters of citizenship has not been absolute.  The existence of 
modest international restraints on the liberty of states in this sphere 
was indicated in Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Questions 
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws 53  (“1930 Hague 
Convention”).  The Convention reaffirmed the traditional view that 
“[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law who are its 
nationals,”54 but proceeded to stipulate that nationality laws enacted 
by a state “shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is 
consistent with international conventions, international custom, and 
 
own property, to have health care, to send one’s children to school, to work, and to 
travel to and from one’s country of residence.”); Howard, supra note 46, at 286. 
 50 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 852 (Robert Jennings & Arthur 
Watts eds., 9th ed. 2008). 
 51 Second (Extraordinary) Session, Advisory Opinion No. 4, 1923 P.C.I.J.  (ser. 
B) 7, 24 (Feb. 7).  
 52  See Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging 
Right to an Effective Nationality under International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1141, 1152 
(1998) (“In the context of state succession, the traditional view holds that the 
nationality of individuals affected by a change in sovereignty must be determined 
by the domestic law of the states concerned.”). 
 53 See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality 
Laws art. 1, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention on 
Nationality]. 
 54 Id. art. 1.  
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the principles of law generally recognized with regard to 
nationality.”55  It was thus observed that the 1930 Hague Convention 
“simultaneously asserts the principle of state discretion over 
nationality questions and the principle of international limitations 
on state discretion—without specifying what those limitations 
might be.”56 
It seems, however, that prior to the development of international 
human rights law, customary international law imposed only 
negative limitations on state discretion in matters of citizenship.  
These limitations provided that a state cannot claim that its 
conferring of citizenship on an individual is entitled to recognition 
by other states in the absence of sufficient factual ties between that 
state and the individual concerned.57  International law restraints on 
state discretion in matters of citizenship did not take the form of 
positive citizenship rights that individuals possess with respect to a 
particular state.58 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 Blackman, supra note 52, at 1154. 
 57 Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 22-26 (Apr. 6).  This 
case involved a claim for damages filed by Liechtenstein against Guatemala on 
behalf of Nottebohm, a resident of Guatemala who was granted citizenship by 
Liechtenstein.  The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) held that Guatemala was 
under no obligation to recognize the citizenship granted by Liechtenstein to 
Nottebohm, and that Liechtenstein, therefore, was not entitled to exercise 
diplomatic protection in respect of Nottebohm.  The Court reasoned that the 
granting of citizenship did not reflect real and effective ties between Liechtenstein 
and Nottebohm, and that a state’s policy with regard to the granting of citizenship 
merits recognition by other states only if “it has acted in conformity with [the] 
general aim of making the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual’s 
genuine connection with the State.” Id.  See also Spiro, supra note 31, at 705 
(“Nottebohm was merely an extension of the accepted rule that states could not 
reach out to claim those to whom they had no real connection.”); Blackman, supra 
note 52, at 1158 (“In relation to nationality law, then, the international limitations 
on state discretion affirmed in Nottebohm remained negative in character, taking the 
form of non-recognition by other international subjects.”). 
 58 See Spiro, supra note 31, at 698 (“The early law of nationality was bounded 
by the interests of states vis-a-vis each other, not the interests of individuals.”); 
Blackman, supra note 52, at 1158 (noting that in Nottebohm “the Court [did not] assert 
any dramatic positive rights of individuals with respect to nationality claims viz. 
states.”). 
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 ii. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International 
Human Rights Treaties 
The right to a nationality was introduced into the sphere of 
international law in 1948 by Article 15 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (“UDHR”), which provided that:  
1.  Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor 
denied the right to change his nationality.59 
The positive character of Article 15 has been disputed in the 
literature.  It has been argued that “the article’s vagueness has 
robbed it of any immediate force.  Most significantly, Article 15 does 
not carry a specific corresponding obligation on states to confer 
nationality.  In other words, the article fails to indicate precisely to 
which nationality one has the right and under what circumstances 
that right arises.”60 
The ICCPR, an instrument intended to give legal effect to the 
UDHR, does not include any reference to a general right to 
nationality.  Commentators reviewing the drafting history of the 
ICCPR have attributed this omission to the complexity of 
developing rules for the realization of the general principle stated in 
the UDHR.61  Article 24(3) of the ICCPR, which concerns the rights 
of children, states that “[e]very child has the right to acquire a 
nationality.”62  The right of children to acquire a nationality was also 
recognized by Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“Child Convention”), which stipulates:  
 
 59 UDHR, supra note 41, art. 15(1)-(2). 
 60 Blackman, supra note 52, at 1172 (internal italics omitted); see also Edwards, 
supra note 33, at 14 (“No corresponding obligation on states to grant nationality was 
elaborated in the UDHR.”). 
 61 See, e.g., Johannes M.M. Chan, The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right, 12 
HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1991). 
 62 ICCPR, supra note 38, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.  Similarly, according to principle 
3 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted by the U.N. General 
Assembly, “[t]he child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a nationality.”  
G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Prin. 3 (Dec. 10, 1959). 
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1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and 
shall have the right from birth to a name, [and] the right to 
acquire a nationality . . . 
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these 
rights in accordance with their national law and their 
obligations under the relevant international instruments in 
this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be 
stateless.63 
These instruments do not explicitly identify which state bears 
the corresponding obligation to grant citizenship.64   
Article 2(1) of the Child Convention, however, requires states to 
respect and ensure the rights enunciated in the Convention “to each 
child within their jurisdiction without discrimination.”65  Based on a 
joint reading of Article 7 and Article 2(1) of the Child Convention, 
the ILC construed this instrument to require that “unless the child 
acquires the nationality of another State, he or she has, in the last 
instance, the right to the nationality of the State on the territory of 
which he or she was born.“66  A similar construction may be applied 
to Article 24(3) of the ICCPR, in view of Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, 
which requires states to respect and ensure the rights enunciated in 
this instrument “to all individuals within [their] territory and subject 
to [their] jurisdiction.”67 
This construction of Article 24(3) of the ICCPR and of Article 7 
of the Child Convention is not shared by everyone, however.  In its 
General Comment No. 17, which addressed the construction of 
Article 24 of the ICCPR, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (“UNHRC”) did not identify which state bears the 
obligation to grant a child citizenship to prevent statelessness or 
 
 63 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Child Convention]. 
 64 See Gerard-René de Groot, Children, Their Right to a Nationality and Child 
Statelessness, in NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 144, 
146 (Alice Edwards & Laura Van Waas eds., 2014) (“Neither the ICCPR nor the CRC 
[Child Convention] indicate which nationality a child may have a right to . . . .”). 
 65 Child Convention, supra note 63, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 46. 
 66 ILC Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, at 36, cmt. 2. 
 67 ICCPR, supra note 38, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173. 
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otherwise. 68   Jeffrey Blackman argued that Article 24(3) of the 
ICCPR, granting children a right to nationality, “is undermined by 
the failure to specify upon whom a corresponding obligation to 
grant nationality falls,” 69  in the same way that Article 15 of the 
UDHR is undermined by its own vagueness.  This view seems to 
pertain to Article 7 of the Child Convention, as well. 
Article 1(1) of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness states that “[a] Contracting State shall grant its 
nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be 
stateless.”70  “Statelessness is . . . the legal condition of being without 
a nationality.”71  The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
provides the clarity that is absent from the ICCPR and Child 
Convention, by explicitly identifying the state in which a stateless 
person was born as the bearer of the obligation to grant citizenship. 
Israel is party to the ICCPR and to the Child Convention. 72 
Hence, under human rights treaty law, Israel arguably has an 
 
 68 United Nations Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 17: Rights of the 
Child (Article 24), sec. 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (Apr. 7, 1989). 
 69 Blackman, supra note 52, at 1172. 
 70 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 1(1), Aug. 30, 1961, 989 
U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter Statelessness Convention].  The Convention allows a state 
to determine whether nationality is granted “(a) at birth, by operation of law, or (b) 
upon an application being lodged with the appropriate authority.”  Id.  See also id. 
art. 1(2) (A state that opts for the grant of nationality upon an application must 
allow the person concerned to submit such application within the period between 
her eighteenth birthday and her twenty-first birthday, and may require, as 
conditions for the grant of its nationality: (a) “that the person concerned has 
habitually resided in the territory of the State for such period as may be fixed by 
that State, not exceeding five years immediately preceding the lodging of the 
application nor ten years in all;” (b) “that the person concerned has neither been 
convicted of an offence against national security nor has been sentenced to 
imprisonment for a term of five years or more on a criminal charge;” and (c) “that 
the person concerned has always been stateless.”). 
 71 Blackman, supra note 52, at 1176; see also Convention Relating to the Status 
of Stateless Persons art. 1, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (“The term ‘stateless 
person’ means a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the 
operation of its law.”). 
 72 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Status of Treaties, Depositary, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_n
o=IV-4&src=IND [https://perma.cc/R8X8-BKKR]; Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, Status of Treaties, Depositary, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&cha
pter=4&lang=en [https://perma.cc/B69Z-UAMJ]. 
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obligation to grant citizenship to children, born in its territory, who 
would otherwise remain stateless.  Even this limited obligation is 
contingent upon a reading of the ICCPR and of the Child 
Convention that is not shared by everyone.  Israel is not a party to 
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 73  nor to any 
regional human rights treaty that recognizes a right to nationality.74 
The norm of non-discrimination, enshrined in IHRL treaty 
provisions, also bears on the obligations of Israel to grant 
citizenship.75  Article 26 of the ICCPR prohibits the discriminatory 
treatment of individuals based on race, religion, or national origin, 
among other things.76  Although the ICCPR does not stipulate a 
general right to citizenship, “[o]n the face of Article 26, the 
provisions for equality and non-discrimination are not confined in 
application to the rights set forth in the Covenant,”77 and therefore 
apply to the granting of citizenship, as well.  The International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, to which Israel is a party, also guarantees the right 
of everyone, without distinction as to race, color, or national or 
ethnic origin, to equality before the law in the enjoyment of the right 
to nationality.78 
 
 73  Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Status of Treaties, Depositary, 
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (indicating that Israel has signed the 
Convention but has not ratified it), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-4&c
hapter=5&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/7C6K-G8E8]. 
 74 See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights art. 20(2), Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (“Every person has the right to the nationality 
of the state in whose territory he was born if he does not have the right to any other 
nationality.”); see also European Convention on Nationality, supra note 41, arts. 4, 6 
(affirming the principles that “everyone has the right to a nationality” and that 
“statelessness shall be avoided,” and stipulating the rules on nationality that derive 
from these principles). 
 75 See Spiro, supra note 31, at 721 (“[I]n the context of both state succession 
and migration, antidiscrimination norms supply an important baseline.”); see also 
Edwards, supra note 33, at 26 (“[N]on-discrimination in nationality laws is a 
general principle of international law underpinned by many international 
conventions.”). 
 76 ICCPR, supra note 38, 999 U.N.T.S. 179; see also supra text accompanying 
note 43. 
 77 See Blackman, supra note 52, at 1184. 
 78  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, supra note 41, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220; see also International Convention 
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The Citizenship Law enacted by Israel allows a path to 
citizenship based on habitual residence, requiring, among other 
conditions, that individuals lawfully reside in Israel for three of the 
five years preceding the application for citizenship.79  In view of the 
principle of non-discrimination, in granting citizenship based on 
habitual residence, Israel must not discriminate against Palestinian 
residents of West Bank territories that are deemed a part of Israel.  
To the extent that a large number of West Bank Palestinians are 
considered to be its residents, Israel may choose, however, to repeal 
the habitual residence path to citizenship altogether.  Importantly, 
the Israeli Law of Return entitles Jews and their descendants, but not 
others, to acquire Israeli citizenship without establishing habitual 
residence in Israel before applying for citizenship.80  The question of 
whether the ethnically-based discrimination manifest in the Law of 
Return can be justified, in view of the harsh history of the Jewish 
people, as an affirmative action exception to the norm of non-
discrimination, was debated extensively in legal literature.81 
iii. Customary International Law 
In view of the limited and disputed nature of the treaty law 
obligations of Israel in matters of nationality, it is important to 
examine whether the annexation of territory by a state gives rise to 
a broader and clearer obligation of that state under customary 
international law to confer citizenship upon the residents of the 
annexed territory.  This question was discussed in the legal literature 
as well as by the ILC in relation to state succession. 
 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Status of Treaties, Depositary, 
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&
chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/636V-HC6B]. 
 79 See § 5(a), Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 50 (1951-52), as amended (Isr.). 
 80 Law of Return, 5710-1950, LSI 4 114 (1950), as amended (Isr.); see also 
Jonathan Zasloff, Left and Right in the Middle East: Notes on the Social Construction of 
Race, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 207 (2006) (“Israel’s ‘Law of Return,’ enacted just a few 
months after the founding of the state, explicitly grants automatic citizenship to 
anyone deemed Jewish under the criteria set forth in the law.”). 
 81 For a review of this debate, see, e.g., Zasloff, supra note 80, at 207-210; Yehiel 
S. Kaplan, Immigration Policy of Israel: The Unique Perspective of a Jewish State, 31 
TOURO L. REV. 1089, 1092-98, 1134 (2015). 
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According to Ian Brownlie, a state that gained territory through 
change of sovereignty is required to grant citizenship to the 
residents of such territory.82  Brownlie observed that state practice 
in situations of succession of states, examined as evidence of 
customary international law, “is overwhelmingly in support of the 
view that the population follows the change of sovereignty in 
matters of nationality.”83  This view finds support in the position 
adopted by international organizations involved in recent state 
successions.84 
A similar position has been taken by the ILC in its Draft Articles 
on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of 
States85 (“Draft Articles”).  Article 1 of the Draft Articles stipulates 
that “[e]very individual who, on the date of the succession of States, 
had the nationality of the predecessor State, irrespective of the mode 
of acquisition of that nationality, has the right to the nationality of at 
least one of the States concerned, in accordance with the present 
draft articles.” 86   The ILC noted that Article 1 is based on the 
principle, enshrined in Article 15 of the UDHR, according to which 
everyone has the right to a nationality, although it acknowledged 
that “the positive character of article 15 has been disputed in the 
doctrine.”87 
In assigning the obligation corresponding to the right to 
nationality, the ILC resorted to the concept of “effective nationality,” 
 
 82 Ian Brownlie, The Relations of Nationality in Public International Law, 39 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 284, 320-26 (1963). 
 83 Id. at 320. 
 84 See, e.g., ORG. FOR SEC. & COOP. IN EUR., THE OTTAWA DECLARATION OF THE 
OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY ¶ 34 (July 4-8, 1950), 
https://www.osce.org/pa/38133?download=true [https://perma.cc/4M88-
GADM] (“The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, . . . [u]rges that, upon a change in 
sovereignty, all persons who have a genuine and effective link with a new State 
should acquire the citizenship of that State.”); EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR 
DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, VENICE COMMISSION DECLARATION ON THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF STATE SUCCESSION FOR THE NATIONALITY OF NATURAL PERSONS art. 
8 (Sept. 13-14, 1996), https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/7960 
[https://perma.cc/W6SS-8C8E] (“In all cases of State succession, the successor 
State shall grant its nationality to all nationals of the predecessor State residing 
permanently on the transferred territory.”); European Convention on Nationality, 
supra note 41, art. 18(2). 
 85 ILC Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10. 
 86 Id. at 25, art. 1. 
 87 Id. at 25, cmt. 1-2. 
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which focuses on a territorial nexus between the state and the 
individual, in the form of habitual residence.88  The ILC reasoned 
that “[h]abitual residence is the test that has most often been used in 
[state] practice for defining the basic body of nationals of the 
successor State, even if it was not the only one.”89  The ILC adhered 
to the view that “the juridical relationship of nationality should not 
be based on formality or artifice, but on a real connection between 
the individual and the State.” 90   Article 20 of the Draft Articles 
therefore concludes that “[w]hen part of the territory of a State is 
transferred by that State to another State, the successor State shall 
attribute its nationality to the persons concerned who have their 
habitual residence in the transferred territory and the predecessor 
State shall withdraw its nationality from such persons,” unless the 
individuals concerned opt to retain the nationality of the 
predecessor state. 91   Similarly, Article 21 of the Draft Articles 
stipulates that when two or more States unite to form one successor 
state “the successor State shall attribute its nationality to all persons 
who, on the date of the succession of States, had the nationality of a 
predecessor State.”92  Moreover, based on the ILC’s interpretation of 
the Child Convention regarding the right of a child to nationality, 
Article 13 of the Draft Articles states that “[a] child . . . born after the 
date of the succession of States, who has not acquired any 
nationality, has the right to the nationality of the State concerned on 
whose territory that child was born.”93 
The bulk of authority in the legal literature, however, does not 
support the view that the principles laid out by the ILC have 
consolidated the status of customary international law.  D.P. 
O’Connell concluded that “[u]ndesirable as it may be that any 
persons become stateless as a result of a change of sovereignty, it 
cannot be asserted with any measure of confidence that 
 
 88 Id. at 29, cmt. 4; see also Václav Mikulka (Special Rapporteur), Third Report 
on Nationality in Relation to the Succession of States, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/480 (Feb. 27-
28, 1997) (“The identification of the rules governing the distribution of individuals 
among the States involved in a succession derives in large part from the application 
of the principle of effective nationality to a specific case of State succession.”). 
 89 ILC Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, at 29, cmt. 4. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 41, art. 20. 
 92 Id. at 41-2, art. 21. 
 93 Id. at 35, art. 13. 
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international law, at least in its present stage of development, 
imposes any duty on the successor State to grant nationality.”94  
Similarly, Paul Weis concluded based on an extensive review of state 
practice: 
[T]here is no rule of international law under which the 
nationals of the predecessor State acquire the nationality of 
the successor State.  International law cannot have such a 
direct effect, and the practice of States does not bear out the 
contention that this is inevitably the result of the change of 
sovereignty.95 
Acknowledging that “the overwhelming weight of state practice 
has been for a successor state to confer nationality on the nationals 
of the predecessor state domiciled on the territory concerned,”96 
Jeffrey Blackman nevertheless maintained that such state practice 
“lacks the essential element under international law of opinio 
juris . . . no evidence demonstrates that states have conferred 
nationality in compliance with perceived international legal 
obligations to that effect.”97  Blackman concluded that “the right to 
nationality is probably not part of customary international law, 
given the few international instruments which mention the right 
and the absence of uniform state practice and opinio juris.”98  Recent 
literature seems to confirm this view.99 
 
 94 1 D.P. O’CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 503 (1967). 
 95 WEIS, supra note 33, at 143-44 (“As a rule, however, States have conferred 
their nationality on the former nationals of the predecessor State, and in this regard 
one may say that there is, in the absence of statutory provisions of municipal law, 
a presumption of international law that municipal law has this effect.”). 
 96 Blackman, supra note 52, at 1163. 
 97 Id.  In this regard, Blackman noted that the deliberations of the International 
Law Commission [hereinafter ILC] concerning the Draft Articles do not 
demonstrate a general agreement that the Draft Articles reflect lex lata.  See id. at 
1165; see also Václav Mikulka, Second Rep. on State Succession and Its Impact on the 
Nationality of Natural and Legal Persons, at 129, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/474 (1996) (“[T]he 
comments of delegations [in the course of ILC discussions] were inconclusive as to 
the existence of an international obligation binding upon the successor State 
regarding the granting of its nationality following State succession.”). 
 98 Blackman, supra note 52, at 1176. 
 99 Spiro, supra note 31, at 695-96 (“It is still not possible, however, to speak 
generally of a ‘right to citizenship’ (at least not one enforceable on particular states), 
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Based on the ILC Draft Articles, the approach taken by 
international organizations and international treaties, Blackman 
recognized, however, that “the clear trend in international law is 
toward the imposition of positive obligations on states [with regard 
to the granting of citizenship] deriving from the principle of effective 
nationality . . . at least in the context of state successions.” 100  
Although the status of the right to nationality as lex lata is yet to 
consolidate, Blackman and others consider it to be “an emerging 
right” 101  that, upon state succession, will entitle individuals to 
nationality “in that state with which an individual possesses 
genuine and effective links.”102  Similarly, there are divergent views 
in the literature on whether the right of children, who would 
otherwise be stateless, to acquire the nationality of their state of birth 
has already been consolidated in customary international law or 
whether it is considered an emerging right.103 
 
and it remains difficult even to speak of a right to citizenship in particular cases.  
The trend in practice is not a concerted or broadly conscious one and would not 
satisfy traditional doctrinal standards for establishing customary law.”); Ineta 
Ziemele, State Succession and Issues of Nationality and Statelessness, in NATIONALITY 
AND STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 217, 245 (Alice Edwards & Laura 
Van Waas eds., 2014) (“The fact remains that despite multiple reaffirmations of the 
right to nationality as a human right in different international law and human rights 
texts, the right to a specific nationality has not evolved.”); Id. at 243 (“[I]t is difficult 
to say that there is a clear obligation as a matter of customary international law to 
avoid statelessness in each and every case.”). 
 100 Blackman, supra note 52, at 1170. 
 101 Id. at 1192; see also Spiro, supra note 31, at 720-21 (“[An emerging norm of 
IHRL] holds that habitual residents and their progeny should not be relegated to 
noncitizen status indefinitely and that at some point in time, territorial presence 
should give rise to baseline eligibility for citizenship acquisition.”).  Spiro further 
notes that state practice supports this norm “[i]n the context of state succession 
perhaps more than any other.”  Id. at 721.  
 102 Blackman, supra note 52, at 1192. 
 103 Ziemele, supra note 99, at 243 (“[E]xceptionally in relation to children, the 
obligation not to render them stateless combined with the acknowledged right to 
acquire nationality at birth can be considered as having achieved the necessary 
opinion juris under customary international law and most likely applies irrespective 
of the lawful or unlawful context of territorial change.”).  But see Edwards, supra 
note 33, at 29 (“[T]he duty to prevent statelessness, at least in respect of children, is 
emerging as a norm of customary international law.” (emphasis added)); de Groot, 
supra note 64, at 148 (“[W]ithin the realm of human rights law, there is broad 
recognition of the child’s right to acquire a nationality,” but there is “limited 
guidance on how the right is to be exercised.”). 
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c. The Right to Citizenship and the Acquisition of Territory: Tuaua v. 
United States 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has 
recently addressed a claim to citizenship rights emanating from the 
acquisition by the United States of the territory of American Samoa, 
a portion of a South Pacific archipelago that came under U.S. 
sovereignty in the early 20th Century.104  American Samoa has not 
been incorporated into the United States federal system.  The 
territory is partially self-governed by a democratically elected 
government, but remains under the ultimate supervision of the U.S. 
Secretary of the Interior.105  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952,106  passed by the U.S. Congress, designates persons born in 
American Samoa as “non-citizen nationals” of the United States.107  
In Tuaua v. United States, the Appellants, individuals born in 
American Samoa, claimed that they were entitled to U.S. citizenship 
by birthright, based on the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,108 which provides that “[a]ll 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.”109 
Having concluded that “the Citizenship Clause is textually 
ambiguous as to whether ‘in the United States’ encompasses 
America’s unincorporated territories,”110 the Court resorted to the 
doctrine laid out in the Insular Cases, a series of U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions that examined the reach of the Constitution in territories 
possessed by the United States that are not a part of the federal 
system of states. 111   This doctrine distinguishes between 
incorporated territories, which are designated for statehood from 
the time of acquisition, and unincorporated territories (such as 
 
 104 Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 105 See id. 
 106 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 
163 (1952). 
 107 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 302; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1). 
 108 Tuaua, 788 F.3d. at 302. 
 109 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 110 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 302. 
 111 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75, 77 (1957). 
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American Samoa), which are not designated for statehood.  Whereas 
the Constitution applies with full force to the former, 112  the 
application of any particular constitutional protection to 
unincorporated territories depends on a case-by-case determination 
that the extension of the right to a particular unincorporated 
territory would not be “impractical and anomalous.” 113   Such a 
determination must be made “in view of the particular 
circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives 
which Congress had before it.”114  The reasoning in Tuaua therefore 
focused on examining “whether the circumstances are such that 
recognition of the right to birthright citizenship would prove 
‘impracticable and anomalous,’ as applied to contemporary 
American Samoa.” 115   The Court answered this question in the 
affirmative, and therefore concluded that the Citizenship Clause 
does not extend a right to U.S. citizenship to those born in American 
Samoa.116 
The Court grounded its decision in the principles of democracy 
and self-determination.  The democratically elected government of 
American Samoa joined the United States in opposing the 
appellants’ claim to a constitutional birthright to citizenship. 117  
Speaking for the majority of its constituency, the government of 
American Samoa expressed concerns that the application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to American Samoa 
could undermine “social structures inherent to the traditional 
Samoan way of life,” 118  for example, “by imperiling American 
Samoa’s traditional, racially-based land alienation rules.”119   The 
Court considered it “anomalous to impose citizenship over the 
objections of the American Samoan people themselves, as expressed 
through their democratically elected representatives.”120  Citing the 
 
 112 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 306. 
 113 Reid, 354 U.S at 75. 
 114 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 309 (citing Reid, 354 U.S at 75). 
 115 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 309. 
 116 Id. at 302, 310. 
 117 Id. at 301. 
 118 Id. at 309. 
 119 Id. at 310. 
 120 Id. 
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right of peoples to self-determination, enshrined in the United 
Nations Charter,121 the Court elaborated: 
We can envision little that is more anomalous, under modern 
standards, than the forcible imposition of citizenship against 
the majoritarian will . . . . To hold the contrary would be to 
mandate an irregular intrusion into the autonomy of Samoan 
democratic decision-making; an exercise of paternalism—if 
not overt cultural imperialism—offensive to the shared 
democratic traditions of the United States and modern 
American Samoa.122 
The reasoning of the Court did not address the right to 
citizenship in international human rights law, either in the 
interpretation of the constitutional Citizenship Clause or as an 
independent legal principle, outside the scope of the Citizenship 
Clause.  This may be reasonably explained by the Court adhering to 
the position pronounced by a U.S. District Court judge six decades 
earlier, which holds that “citizenship depends . . . entirely on 
municipal law and is not regulated by international law.  
Acquisition of citizenship of the United States is governed solely by 
the Constitution and by acts of Congress.”123  Yet Tuaua has limited 
weight in assessing the state of IHRL on the right to citizenship, as 
the unique circumstances of the case stray far from the typical 
situations of acquisition of territory by a state envisioned in the ILC 
Draft Articles. 
American Samoa, which maintains a high degree of autonomy, 
is governed by a democratically elected legislature and governor.124 
This allows American Samoans to enjoy, in American Samoa, the 
 
 121 U.N. Charter arts. 1, 73; Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 311. 
 122 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 311-12. 
 123 Tomasicchio v. Acheson, 98 F.Supp. 166, 169 (D.D.C. 1951). 
 124 For the extent of autonomy exercised by American Samoa, see, e.g., Office 
of Insular Affairs, American Samoa, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/american-samoa [https://perma.cc/YF6K-
SEM9] (“The Immigration and Naturalization Service of the U.S. Department of 
Justice does not exercise jurisdiction in American Samoa. No one may enter 
American Samoa unless he or she complies with certain entry requirements of the 
American Samoa Government.”).  Moreover, American Samoa has its own land 
ownership laws, which are not subject to the requirements of the U.S. Constitution.  
See Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 309-312; see also id. at 302 (noting the democratic nature of the 
government of American Samoa). 
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rights typically associated with citizenship, including the right to 
democratic participation.  According to the elected representatives 
of the people of American Samoa, the legal regime that applies to 
the territory is preferred by the majority of American Samoans.125 
American Samoans are entitled to U.S. passports126 and presumably 
treated by the U.S. government not differently from U.S. citizens 
when it comes to diplomatic protection.  American Samoans, 
therefore, appear to enjoy the equivalent of citizenship in a 
democratic state, although they do not enjoy all the particular 
benefits of U.S. citizenship, dubbed by the U.S. Supreme Court “one 
of the most valuable rights in the world today.”127 
The arguments of democracy and self-determination against the 
granting of citizenship, which emanate from the special, highly 
autonomous status of American Samoa, are unavailable in typical 
situations of state succession, where the transferred territory is fully 
integrated into the successor state.  The self-determination argument 
invoked by the Court against the granting of citizenship to 
American Samoans would ring particularly hollow when it comes 
to the reality of de facto annexation by an occupier of the occupied 
territory, which suppresses the exercise of the right to self-
determination by the local population. 
d. Are West Bank Palestinians Stateless? 
To the extent that treaty provisions that are binding on Israel in 
matters of nationality, namely, Article 24(3) of the ICCPR and Article 
7 of the Child Convention, require Israel to grant citizenship to 
individuals born in territory it has annexed, such requirement is 
confined to those who would otherwise be stateless.128  It seems that 
 
 125 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 309-12. 
 126 Joseph E. Sung, Redressing the Legal Stigmatization of American Samoans, 89 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2016). 
 127 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). 
 128 See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text. 
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most West Bank Palestinians are considered stateless for the 
purpose of the application of IHRL in matters of nationality.129 
In 1950, during the period of Jordanian occupation of the West 
Bank, Jordan declared the annexation of the West Bank.130  Shortly 
after the annexation, which was considered illegal and void by the 
bulk of the international community,131 Jordan granted Jordanian 
citizenship to the residents of the West Bank, pursuant to the 
Jordanian Nationality Law of 1954. 132   In 1988, however, two 
decades after the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank, Jordan terminated its annexation of the West Bank, renounced 
its sovereignty claim to this territory, and divested the residents of 
the West Bank of their Jordanian citizenship.133  This last measure 
was undertaken in the form of government instructions, which 
stipulated that “every person residing in the West Bank prior to 
31.7.1988 is a Palestinian and not a Jordanian citizen.”134  Although 
some commentators have questioned whether the divestiture of 
West Bank Palestinians of their Jordanian citizenship was valid 
under Jordanian domestic law,135 such validity was recognized by 
the High Court of Justice in Jordan, which considered the 
 
 129 Yousef T. Jabareen, The Politics of Equality: The Limits of Collective Rights 
Litigation and the Case of the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 4 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 
23, 30 n. 28 (2013) (“The majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza hold 
no citizenship in any country . . . . The vast majority of Palestinians in the occupied 
Palestinian territories are stateless . . . .”). 
 130 Lewis Saideman, Do Palestinian Refugees Have a Right of Return to Israel? An 
Examination of the Scope of and Limitations on the Right of Return, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 829, 
868-69 (2004); BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 204. 
 131  BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 204 (observing with regard to the annexation 
by Jordan of the West Bank, “[t]his purported annexation . . . was, however, widely 
regarded, including by the Arab League, as illegal and void, and was recognized 
only by Britain, Iraq, and Pakistan”). 
 132  Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality, art. 3(2) (Jordan), Al-Jaridah al-
Rasmiyyah lil-Mamlakah al-Urduniyyah al-Hasimiyyah, No. 1171, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ea13.html [https://perma.cc/H569-
4VYJ]; Saideman, supra note 130, at 869. 
 133  John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are they Treaties?, 30 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 717, 728 (1997); Al Kour v. Minister of Interior, Jordanian High 
Court of Justice, 39 JORDANIAN BAR ASS’N, 1040 (1991), translated in 6 PALESTINE Y.B. 
INT’L L. 68 (1990-1991). 
 134 Al Kour, 6 PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L. at 70 (citing the instructions issued by 
the Jordanian government). 
 135 E.g., Saideman, supra note 130, at 873-74. 
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instructions issued by the government as “acts of the State acting as 
a sovereign.”136 
The debate on whether or not a Palestinian state exists and holds 
title to the territory of the West Bank137 does not seem to bear on the 
status of the Palestinians as stateless, as far as IHRL is concerned.  
To the extent that a Palestinian state exists, the citizenship it extends 
to West Bank Palestinians is largely void of substance, because 
under Israeli occupation such a state has never had the capacity to 
offer Palestinians the benefits typically associated with 
citizenship.138  The lack of effective Palestinian control over the West 
Bank is the main argument in support of the view that the 
Palestinian political entity in that area does not meet the test for 
statehood under international law.139  Assuming that international 
law would recognize the existence of a state that does not have, and 
has never had, the capacity to extend effective citizenship—a highly 
doubtful proposition—relying on such recognition to narrow the 
sphere of individuals who benefit from the human rights treaty 
provisions on the prevention of statelessness would undercut the 
rationale underlying these provisions. 
e. Summary 
The above analysis showed that a plausible, albeit not 
undisputed, reading of treaty provisions that are binding on Israel 
 
 136 Al Kour, 6 PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L.at 70. 
 137 See, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
446-47 (2nd ed. 2006) (rejecting the contention that a Palestinian state already 
exists); Paul Eden, Palestinian Statehood: Trapped Between Rhetoric and Realpolitik, 62 
INT’L. COMPAR. L.Q. 225, 233 (2013) (“[T]he powers currently possessed by the 
Palestinian Authority fall short of the independence necessary for Palestine (as 
currently constituted) to be regarded as a sovereign State.”); John Quigley, Palestine 
is a State: A Horse with Black and White Stripes is a Zebra, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 749, 752 
(2011) (contending that Palestine is a state); Francis A. Boyle, The Creation of the State 
of Palestine, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301, 301-03 (1990) (arguing that Palestine meets the 
criteria for statehood). 
 138  Jabareen, supra note 129 (“[W]ith the new recognition by 138 states of 
Palestine as a state, Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem may 
find themselves eligible for passports and nationality in the state of Palestine.  It is 
questionable, however, what kind of citizenship rights the state of Palestine could 
provide as long as it remains under Israeli occupation.”). 
 139 Eden, supra note 137, at 233-34. 
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in matters of nationality, namely, Article 24(3) of the ICCPR and 
Article 7 of the Child Convention, suggests that Israel is obligated to 
grant citizenship to individuals born in its territory, who would 
otherwise be stateless.  This part further argued that most West Bank 
Palestinians are currently considered stateless.  Therefore, if a given 
area of the West Bank is considered to have become part of Israel, 
most Palestinians subsequently born in such territory are plausibly 
entitled to receive Israeli citizenship under the treaty obligations of 
Israel, as a party to the ICCPR and to the Child Convention. 
In the case of lawful annexation of territory by a state as a form 
of state succession, there also seems to be an emerging right under 
customary international law of the residents of the annexed territory 
to receive the citizenship of the annexing state.  The ILC Draft 
Articles and the legal literature suggest that this emerging right, yet 
to consolidate as lex lata, would not be restricted to children and 
would not depend on whether or not the individuals concerned are 
otherwise stateless. 
International law prohibits the unilateral annexation by Israel of 
the occupied West Bank.  The inquiry regarding the right of West 
Bank Palestinians to Israeli citizenship must therefore answer two 
questions.  First, do the treaty obligations of Israel in matters of 
nationality, and the broader, emerging right to nationality under 
customary international law, extend to the residents of territory that 
has been illegally annexed by Israel?  In other words, would the 
illegal annexation by Israel of the West Bank make that territory a 
part of Israel for the purposes of applying the norms of IHRL that 
concern the right to nationality?  Second, if the answer to the first 
question is affirmative, do the policies pursued by Israel in relation 
to the occupied West Bank amount to annexation? 
III. ILLEGAL ANNEXATION AND THE RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP 
a. Illegal Annexation and the Obligation of Non-Recognition 
Attaching to illegal annexation a legal effect that extends as far 
as the emergence of citizenship rights stands in tension with a well-
established norm of customary international law, which holds that 
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such annexation is null and void.140  As noted by Yoram Dinstein, 
“any unilateral annexation by the Occupying Power of an occupied 
territory—in whole or in part—would be legally stillborn.”141  This 
norm derives from a fundamental principle of international law 
concerning the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory through 
the use of force.142 
Moreover, the annexation by an occupier of an occupied 
territory violates the right of peoples to self-determination,143 and 
possibly the prohibition against the use of force.144  Both the right to 
self-determination and the prohibition against the use of force have 
acquired the status of peremptory norms of customary international 
law.145  These norms are reinforced by the international law on the 
 
 140 See S.C. Res. 478, ¶¶ 2-3 (Aug. 20, 1980) (unanimously decreeing that the 
annexation by Israel of occupied East Jerusalem is a violation of international law 
and is therefore “null and void”); AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE WALL: 
RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 24 (2017) (“Annexation . . . 
does not alter the status of the territory or its population.”). 
 141 DINSTEIN, supra note 15, at 50. 
 142 See S.C. Res. 242, pmbl. (Nov. 22, 1967) (emphasizing “the inadmissibility 
of the acquisition of territory by war”); Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 
117 (July 9) (citing resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. 
Security Council, which “have referred, with regard to Palestine, to the customary 
rule of ‘the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war’”); BENVENISTI, supra 
note 26, at 6 (“The foundation upon which the entire law of occupation is based is 
the principle of inalienability of sovereignty through unilateral action of a foreign 
power, whether through the actual or the threatened use of force, or in any way 
unauthorized by the sovereign.”). 
 143  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 121-22 (July 9) (noting 
that actions by Israel that may result in the de facto annexation of parts of the West 
Bank violate the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination). 
 144 BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 245, 349 (noting that de facto annexation of 
occupied territory amounts to aggression). 
 145 See Glen Anderson, A Post-Millennial Inquiry into the United Nations Law of 
Self-Determination: A Right to Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession?, 49 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1183, 1185 (2016) (“[S]elf-determination is widely regarded as a 
peremptory norm (jus cogens) . . . .”); Peter G. Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value 
Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in International Law, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 11 
n.29 (2008) (“In the opinion of many jurists and writers, self-
determination . . . enjoys the status of a peremptory norm (jus cogens).”); Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 190, 212 (June 27) (recognizing the prohibition on the use of force 
as a peremptory norm); DINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 99-104 (discussing the 
peremptory nature of the prohibition on the use of force). 
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responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts, which 
decrees that states are under an obligation not to recognize as lawful 
a situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm of 
general international law, nor render aid or assistance in 
maintaining that situation146 (“obligation of non-recognition”).  The 
obligation of non-recognition is a manifestation of the principle of 
legality in international law.  As noted by one commentator: 
[T]he rationale of the obligation of non-recognition is to 
prevent, in so far as possible, the validation of an unlawful 
situation by seeking to ensure that a fait accompli resulting 
from serious illegalities do not consolidate and crystallize 
over time into situations recognized by the international 
legal order . . . . [T]he function of non-recognition is to 
vindicate the ‘legal character of international law against the 
“law-creating effect of facts.”’147 
The ILC observed that the obligation of non-recognition “not 
only refers to the formal recognition of [a situation created by a 
breach of a peremptory norm], but also prohibits acts which would 
imply such recognition.”148   This prohibition seems to extend to 
“’any action which might confer a semblance of legitimacy on the 
illegal regime.’”149 
Recognizing a right to citizenship based on illegal annexation 
would not cure the unlawfulness of the annexation.  The “legally 
stillborn” annexation would be brought to life only for the limited 
purpose of citizenship, and its status as legally void would 
otherwise remain unchanged.  Yet, attaching to an illegal annexation 
 
 146 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts on its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 114, art. 41(2) 
(2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility of States], 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8JJM-9QGB]. 
 147  Martin Dawidowicz, The Obligation of Non-Recognition of an Unlawful 
Situation, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 677, 678 (James Crawford, 
Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson eds., 2010) (quoting HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, 
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 430 (1947)). 
 148 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 146, at 114, cmt. 5 
(alteration in original). 
 149 Dawidowicz, supra note 147, at 680 (quoting G.A. Res. 2946 (XXVII) (Dec. 
7, 1972).  See also G.A. Res. 2946 (XXVII), ¶ 5 (Dec. 7, 1972). 
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legal consequences that extend as far as citizenship, the 
distinguishing mark of the relationship between individuals and 
their state, would strengthen the political claim of the annexing state 
to sovereignty over the annexed territory, and would thereby erode 
the political force of the principle of the inadmissibility of the 
acquisition of territory through the use of force.  Attributing such 
legal effect to illegal annexation implicitly indicates a degree of 
recognition by international law of the validity of the illegal 
annexation, and cannot be reconciled with an absolute norm 
mandating that such annexation is null and void.  This departure 
from the obligation of non-recognition would exact a toll on the 
principle of legality in international law. 
Yet, international law has allowed for limited erosion of the 
principle that an illegal annexation is null and void, and of its 
corollary, the obligation of non-recognition.  The interests 
underlying these norms must, at times, be balanced against human 
rights, and the contours of this balancing have been delineated by 
international jurisprudence.  The ICJ noted, in the 1971 Namibia 
Advisory Opinion, 150  the obligation of states not to recognize the 
authority of the illegal regime maintained by South Africa in 
Namibia. 151   The ICJ recognized, however, an exception to the 
obligation of non-recognition (the “Namibia exception”), which 
considers the interests of individuals residing in territory controlled 
by the illegal regime.  The ICJ stated: 
In general, the non-recognition of South Africa’s 
administration of the Territory should not result in 
depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived 
from international co-operation.  In particular, while official 
acts performed by the Government of South Africa on behalf 
of or concerning Namibia . . . are illegal and invalid, this 
invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for 
instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the 
 
 150 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. ¶ 16 (June 21). 
 151 Id. ¶¶ 123-24 (June 21). 
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effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the 
inhabitants of the Territory.152 
Delineating the scope of the exception to the obligation of non-
recognition, the majority opinion in the Namibia Advisory Opinion 
referred only to ex post facto recognition of acts of routine 
administration, such as the registration of births, marriages, and 
deaths.  Yet, “the increasingly voluminous body of human rights 
law has had an important effect on the obligation of non-recognition 
and on the exception to it.”153  Thus, in recent years, the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has adopted a broad 
construction of the Namibia exception, which provides for a broad 
ex ante recognition of the legal authority of an illegal regime to the 
extent that such authority is necessary for compliance with the 
positive obligations of the regime to ensure and protect human 
rights.  This court examined the legislative and adjudicative 
authority of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”), 
an entity proclaimed as a state by the Turkish-Cypriot community 
in the territory of northern Cyprus following the Turkish occupation 
of that territory.154 
The proclamation of the TRNC was widely condemned by the 
international community as a violation by Turkey of international 
law.155  No state except Turkey recognized the TRNC as a state, and 
northern Cyprus remained in the eyes of the international 
community a territory under Turkish occupation.156  The ECtHR has 
recognized, however, the validity of criminal laws enacted by the 
illegal regime of the TRNC on the ground that criminal legislation is 
an essential instrument for the protection of human rights, and its 
invalidity would be detrimental to the local population.157  Similarly, 
the ECtHR recognized the validity of TRNC legislation that provides 
 
 152 Id. ¶ 125. 
 153  YAËL RONEN, TRANSITION FROM ILLEGAL REGIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 88 (2011). 
 154 See Rhodri C. Williams, Introductory Note to the European Court of Human 
Rights: Demopoulos v. Turkey, 49 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 816, 816-17 (2010), for a 
historical review of the Turkish invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus and 
the establishment of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” [TRNC]. 
 155 Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 513, ¶¶ 19-23. 
 156 Williams, supra note 154, at 816. 
 157 Foka v. Turkey, App. No. 28940/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 83 (2008); Protopapa v. 
Turkey, App. No. 16084/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 60 (2009). 
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remedies for human rights violations, as well as the authority of 
TRNC courts to apply this legislation,158 citing the need to “avoid in 
the territory of northern Cyprus the existence of a vacuum in the 
protection of . . . human rights.”159  Citing a threshold condition for 
the admissibility of applications to the ECtHR, which requires 
applicants to exhaust domestic remedies before applying to the 
Court, the ECtHR held that victims of human rights violations by 
Turkey in northern Cyprus cannot apply to the ECtHR before 
exhausting the remedies offered by the TRNC legal system.160  It was 
thus observed that “the ECtHR’s interpretation of the Namibia 
Exception calls for a broad ex ante recognition of the legislative and 
adjudicative authority of an illegal regime.  This approach expands 
the scope of the Namibia Exception.”161 
The Court emphasized that this approach did not undermine the 
position taken by the international community regarding the 
illegality of the TRNC regime, and that it recognized the authority 
of TRNC institutions only “for the limited purpose of protecting the 
rights of the territory’s inhabitants.” 162   There is little doubt, 
however, that the broad recognition by the ECtHR of the legal 
authority of the TRNC “benefits the purported sovereignty of the 
illegal regime,” 163  and significantly erodes the principle of non-
recognition.164  It has been noted that “[t]his jurisprudence provides 
such a wide exceptional validity under the Namibia exception, that 
little remains of the obligation of non-recognition insofar as internal 
 
 158 See Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 91-98 (2001); 
Demopoulos v. Turkey, App Nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 
10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 92-96 (2010). 
 159  Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 91, 96 (2001); 
Demopoulos v. Turkey, App Nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 
10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 92-96 (2010). 
 160  Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 98-99 (2001); 
Demopoulos v. Turkey, App Nos. 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 
10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 96-98 (2010). 
 161 Michal Saliternik, Bad Reliance in Public Law, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 1243, 1285 
(2017). 
 162 Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 91-92 (2001); see also 
Foka v. Turkey, App. No. 28940/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 84 (2008). 
 163 RONEN, supra note 153, at 95. 
 164 GROSS, supra note 140, at 93-94 (“Northern Cyprus is viewed as occupied 
territory and the TRNC is unrecognized and considered illegal.  But this 
determination has been gradually eroded in the ECtHR’s case law.”). 
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acts are concerned.”165  This expansive construction of the Namibia 
exception is directly linked to the development of IHRL in the 
decades following the Namibia Advisory Opinion.166 
The breadth of the exception to the obligation of non-recognition 
in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR seems to support extending the 
norms of IHRL on the right to citizenship to situations of illegal 
annexation.  Both the annexation by an occupier of the occupied 
territory and the establishment of the TRNC by Turkey, the occupier 
of northern Cyprus, create an illegal regime in the occupied 
territory, contrary to peremptory norms of international law.167  The 
competing interests underlying the delineation by the ECtHR of the 
exception to the obligation of non-recognition are identical to the 
interests at stake when it comes to recognizing the legal effect of an 
illegal annexation for the purpose of the right to citizenship:  the 
rights of the ousted sovereign, or in current parlance, the right to 
self-determination, and the principle of legality, on one hand, and 
the human rights of individuals, on the other.  The breadth of the 
exception to the obligation of non-recognition in the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR suggests that international law is inclined to grant the 
latter precedence over the former.  This inclination arguably extends 
to the right of the residents of an unlawfully annexed territory to 
receive the citizenship of the annexing state. 
The ILC has explicitly restricted the purview of its Draft Articles 
“to the effects of a succession of States occurring in conformity with 
international law and, in particular, with the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”168  
In the view of the ILC, “it was not incumbent upon it to study 
questions of nationality which could arise in situations such as 
illegal annexation of territory.”169  One commentator has noted that 
 
 165 RONEN, supra note 153, at 92. 
 166  Id. at 94 (“[T]he expansion of the Namibia exception is an inevitable 
consequence of the expansion of international human rights law, which was not 
fully envisaged in 1971.”). 
 167  See Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and the Criteria for 
Statehood in International Law, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 75 (2015) (noting that the TRNC 
was denied statehood because it was established in breach “of the interconnected 
peremptory norms of the right of peoples to self-determination and the prohibition 
on the illegal use of force”). 
 168 ILC Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, at 27, art. 3. 
 169 Id. at 27, art. 3, cmt. 2. 
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in placing this restriction on the purview of its Draft Articles, “the 
ILC confirmed that different rules and considerations apply in 
situations of territorial changes contrary to international law,”170 so 
that in such situations “[t]he starting point . . . on whether there are 
any relevant rules affecting regulation of nationality is clearly 
different.” 171   Note, however, that the ILC did not exclude the 
possibility of a citizenship right emanating from an illegal 
annexation.  In its Commentary to the Draft Articles, the ILC 
stressed that the restriction of its Draft Articles to situations of lawful 
succession of states “is without prejudice to the right of everyone to 
a nationality in accordance with Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.”172 
The difference between any unilateral annexation by Israel of the 
West Bank and situations of state succession addressed in the legal 
literature on the right to citizenship and in the ILC Draft Articles 
extends beyond the illegality of the former.  A succession of states 
concerns the replacement of a predecessor state by a successor state 
in the sovereignty over territory.173   To the extent that Israel has 
annexed the West Bank, it is far from clear that there existed a 
predecessor state, namely, a sovereign state of Palestine.  Yet the 
human rights rationale underlying the emerging right to citizenship 
in situations of state succession equally applies where a state 
annexes territory that was not a part of another state prior to the 
annexation.  The ILC indicated that the right to nationality laid out 
in the Draft Articles “applies to this particular situation [of 
succession of states] the general principle contained in Article 15 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was the first 
international instrument embodying the ‘right of everyone to a 
nationality.’” 174   This general principle seems to support the 
extension of the emerging right to citizenship to situations of 
 
 170 Ziemele, supra note 99, at 229. 
 171 Id. at 236. 
 172 ILC Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, at 27, art. 3, cmt. 3. 
 173 Id. at 25, art. 2(a) (“‘Succession of States’ means the replacement of one State 
by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory.”). 
 174 Id. at 25, art. 1, cmt. 1 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
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annexation that do not fall squarely within the definition of state 
succession.175 
In conclusion, this part has shown that the existing and 
emerging IHRL obligations of Israel to grant citizenship to residents 
of territory acquired by Israel extend to Palestinians residing in areas 
of the West Bank illegally annexed by Israel.  In other words, an 
occupied territory unlawfully annexed by the occupier may be 
viewed as part of the occupier’s own territory for the limited 
purpose of the right to citizenship. 
b. The Right of East Jerusalem Palestinians to Israeli Citizenship 
In contrast to the bulk of the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem 
has been formally annexed by Israel.176  Therefore, even under a 
narrow perception of annexation limited to formal annexation, the 
existing and emerging IHRL obligations of Israel to grant citizenship 
to residents of territory acquired by Israel seem to apply to 
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem. 
The path to citizenship for East Jerusalem Palestinians formally 
laid out by domestic Israeli law seems consistent with the IHRL 
treaty obligations of Israel under the ICCPR and the Child 
Convention, regarding the granting of citizenship to persons born in 
 
 175  As a corollary of its narrow definition of succession of states, which 
requires the existence of both a predecessor state and a successor state, the ILC has 
limited the category of individuals whose right to citizenship is discussed in its 
Draft Articles to “every individual who, on the date of the succession of States, had 
the nationality of the predecessor State and whose nationality may be affected by 
such succession.”  See id. at 26, art. 2(f).  This limitation seems irrelevant, however, 
to situations in which an annexed territory was not a part of any state prior to its 
annexation.  It has been noted that the ILC has followed “the principle that aliens 
resident in the territory do not acquire the nationality of the successor state.”  See 
Blackman, supra note 52, at 1168.  This principle would hardly be relevant to an 
Israeli annexation of the West Bank, as the Palestinian residents of the West Bank 
cannot be considered aliens in this territory. 
 176 See § 1, Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 5740-1980, SH 980 186, (Isr.), 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZHT8-AC39] (“Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of 
Israel.”); HCJ 282/88 Awad v. Prime Minister, 42(2) PD 424, 429 (1988) (Isr.) (noting 
that Israel has annexed East Jerusalem); see also Asher Maoz, Application of Israeli 
Law to the Golan Heights is Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 355, 366 (1994) (noting 
that the enactment by Israel of Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel has 
consolidated the annexation of East Jerusalem). 
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Israel who would otherwise remain stateless.  The opportunity to 
acquire citizenship formally offered by Israel to the residents of East 
Jerusalem may conceivably be reconciled also with the broader, 
emerging norm of customary international law regarding the right 
of persons residing in territory acquired by a state to receive the 
citizenship of the latter. 
The provisions of the Israeli Citizenship Law177 on the right of 
stateless persons born in Israel to receive Israeli citizenship follow 
the requirements of the Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, 178  although Israel is not party to the Convention.  
Section 4A of the Citizenship Law stipulates that: 
 
A person born after the establishment of the State of Israel in 
a place that was an Israeli territory at the date of his birth, 
and has never possessed any citizenship, will become an 
Israeli citizen if he so requests within the period between his 
eighteenth birthday and his twenty-first birthday, provided 
that he has been a resident of Israel in the five consecutive 
years prior to the submission of the request (“Statelessness 
Clause”).179  
 
The Minister of Interior has no discretion to deny the request 
other than on the grounds that the person in question was convicted 
of a national security offense, or was sentenced to imprisonment of 
five years or more, having been convicted of any other offense.180 
Although many East Jerusalem Palestinians are eligible for 
citizenship under the Statelessness Clause,181 the Israeli government 
has adopted a policy, yet to be reviewed by the courts, of channeling 
requests for citizenship by East Jerusalem Palestinians away from 
the Statelessness Clause, and processing such requests only under 
the general naturalization provision contained in Section 5 of the 
Citizenship Law, which is not limited to cases of statelessness.182  
 
 177 See generally Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 50 (1951-52), as amended 
(Isr.). 
 178 See Statelessness Convention, supra note 70, and accompanying text. 
 179 § 4A(a), Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 50 (1951-52), as amended (Isr.). 
 180 § 4A(b), Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 50 (1951-52), as amended (Isr.). 
 181 AMNON RAMON & YAËL RONEN, RESIDENTS, NOT CITIZENS: ISRAELI POLICY 
TOWARDS THE ARABS IN EAST JERUSALEM, 1967-2017 at 311 (2017). 
 182 Id. at 311-12. 
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Section 5 of the Citizenship Law offers a path to citizenship through 
naturalization to those who have been lawfully residing in Israel for 
three of the five years preceding the application for citizenship, 
provided that the applicant possesses some knowledge of the 
Hebrew language and has renounced or otherwise forfeited foreign 
citizenship. 183   Although Section 5 provides that the granting of 
citizenship to individuals who meet these preconditions is subject to 
the discretion of the Minister of Interior,184 the Supreme Court of 
Israel appears to have taken the position that East Jerusalem 
Palestinians who meet these preconditions are generally entitled to 
citizenship.185  The Court noted that the entire population of East 
Jerusalem would have been granted Israeli citizenship in the wake 
of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, were it not for the 
Palestinians’ own rejection of Israeli citizenship, and that “each one 
[of the residents of East Jerusalem] has been given the option to 
apply [individually] and receive Israeli citizenship . . . .  Some have 
applied and received Israeli citizenship.”186 
Israel has placed procedural hurdles in the path to citizenship 
offered to East Jerusalem Palestinians.  The most significant of those 
has been an unreasonably long timeframe of around six years for 
receiving and processing citizenship applications.187  In some cases, 
Israel has also presented applicants for citizenship with unrealistic 
evidentiary requirements to prove residency in East Jerusalem.188  
These procedural hurdles can hardly be reconciled with an 
entitlement of East Jerusalem Palestinians to citizenship, and may 
 
 183 § 5(a) Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 50 (1951-52), as amended (Isr.). 
 184 § 5(b) Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, LSI 6 50 (1951-52), as amended (Isr.). 
 185 AdminA (DC Jer) 5829/05 Dari v. Ministry of the Interior, ¶ 9 Nevo Legal 
Database (Feb. 1, 2007) (Isr.).  Under the procedure laid out by the Ministry of the 
Interior, citizenship applications may be rejected on security grounds or if the 
applicant has been otherwise involved in criminal activity according to information 
provided to the Minister by Israeli police.  See RAMON & RONEN, supra note 181, at 
313.  These grounds for rejecting citizenship applications are yet to be reviewed by 
the courts. 
 186 AdminA (DC Jer) 5829/05 Dari v. Ministry of the Interior, ¶ 9 Nevo Legal 
Database (Feb. 1, 2007) (Isr.) (alteration in original). 
 187  Nir Hasson, Israel Vows to Drastically Cut Wait Time for Jerusalem 
Palestinians’ Citizenship Applications, HAARETZ (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-vows-to-cut-wait-time-
for-jerusalem-palestinians-citizenship-applications-1.6975728 
[https://perma.cc/N4LM-4KAU]. 
 188 RAMON & RONEN, supra note 181, at 312. 
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be viewed as contrary to existing and emerging IHRL norms on the 
right to citizenship applicable to Israel.  The Israeli government, 
however, has recently pledged to the Supreme Court to drastically 
expedite the naturalization process for East Jerusalem Palestinians, 
so that the overall waiting period for submission and processing of 
citizenship applications would be reduced to one year.189 
In the five decades that have passed since the annexation of East 
Jerusalem, only a small minority of East Jerusalem Palestinians have 
applied for Israeli citizenship.190  The reluctance of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians to apply for Israeli citizenship is largely of a political 
nature because such action is perceived as a form of recognition of 
Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem, contrary to Palestinian 
national aspirations to establish a Palestinian state with East 
Jerusalem as its capital. 191   In the past decade, however, as the 
possibility of establishing a viable Palestinian state that extends to 
East Jerusalem has become more and more distant, there has been a 
sharp increase in the number of East Jerusalem Palestinians 
applying for Israeli citizenship.192  Commentators predict that the 
expected shortening of waiting periods for the receipt of citizenship 
will further increase the number of citizenship applications 
submitted by East Jerusalem Palestinians.193 
 
 189 Hasson, supra note 187; see also Nir Hasson, Israel Picks Up Pace, Grants 
Citizenship to 1,200 East Jerusalem Palestinians, HAARETZ (Jan. 12, 2020), 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-picks-up-pace-grants-
citizenship-to-1-200-east-jerusalem-palestinians-1.8384270 
[https://perma.cc/BW3G-DTE9] (noting that recent data indicates that, in 2019, the 
government has expedited the processing of citizenship applications submitted by 
residents of East Jerusalem).  
 190 Michael Bachner, Israel to Dramatically Shorten East Jerusalemites’ Path to 
Citizenship – Report, TIMES ISR. (Feb. 27, 2019, 1:46 AM), 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-to-dramatically-shorten-east-
jerusalemites-path-to-citizenship-report/ [https://perma.cc/5ZYW-64TP]. 
 191 Yaffa Zilbershats, Apartheid, International Law, and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory: A Reply to John Dugard and John Reynolds, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 915, 918 (2013) 
(Following the annexation by Israel of East Jerusalem, the Palestinian residents of 
the territory “were given the option of receiving Israeli citizenship, but at the time, 
for political reasons, most chose not to request it.”). 
 192 RAMON & RONEN, supra note 181, at 316. 
 193 Hasson, supra note 187. 
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IV. WHAT AMOUNTS TO ANNEXATION? 
It has been observed that “international law today has more to 
say about the legal consequences of an annexation than about what 
qualifies as one.”194   The international community has taken the 
view that the full extension by an occupying state of its legislative 
jurisdiction, judicial system, and administration to the occupied 
territory amounts to annexation, whether or not these measures are 
accompanied by an explicit proclamation of annexation by the 
occupier. 195   Israel has taken legislative measures extending the 
application of Israeli “law, jurisdiction and administration” to East 
Jerusalem 196  and to the occupied Golan Heights. 197   Israeli 
commentators and judges disagreed on whether these measures, 
which were not accompanied by an explicit proclamation of 
annexation, amounted to an act of annexation, 198  but the 
international community overwhelmingly considered these 
 
 194 Dajani, supra note 18, at 52. 
 195 See infra notes 196-199 and accompanying text. 
 196 Law and Administration Order (No. 1), 5727-1967 (June 28, 1967). 
 197 § 1, Golan Heights Law, 5742-1981, LSI 36 7 (1981-82) (Isr.).  
 198  See, e.g., Maoz, supra note 176, at 356-57 (noting that Israeli legislation 
applying the laws, jurisdiction and administration of Israel to the Golan Heights 
amounts to the annexation of this territory); Leon Sheleff, The Application of Israeli 
Law to the Golan Heights is Not Annexation, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 333, 337 (1994) 
(arguing that the Israeli legislation concerning the Golan Heights “does not amount 
to annexation because it does no more than what is written therein; apply Israeli 
law, administration and government to the Golan Heights”); HCJ 283/69 Ruweidi 
v. Military Court in the Hebron District, 24(2) PD 419, 423 (1970) (Isr.) (examining 
whether East Jerusalem is considered a part of Israel under domestic Israeli law, 
Justice Cohn noted that “the thesis . . . that the application of Israeli law to a 
particular area, is equivalent to the annexation of the area to the State of Israel, still 
requires proof,” and that “there is . . . nothing to prevent the application of the law 
of Israel to occupied territories even in the absence of any intention to annex them 
to the area of the state”); Id. at 424 (Justice Yitzhak Kahan) (“[East Jerusalem] was 
annexed to the State of Israel and constitutes part of its area.”).  The controversy on 
whether Israel annexed East Jerusalem has been resolved with the enactment by the 
Israeli legislature of Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, which stipulated that 
“Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.”  See Maoz, supra note 176, 
at 366 (noting that following the enactment of the Basic Law, “there can no longer 
be any argument regarding . . . Jerusalem’s constituting ‘part of the territory of the 
state of Israel.’”); Sheleff, supra note 198, at 344. 
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measures as such.199  I refer to the full extension by the occupier of 
its legislative jurisdiction, judicial system, and administration to the 
occupied territory as “formal annexation.”200 
International law is unclear, however, on whether and to what 
extent annexation of occupied territory may arise from conduct on 
the part of the occupier that does not amount to formal annexation.201  
With the exception of East Jerusalem, Israel has not effected the 
formal annexation of the West Bank.  Plans to formally annex large 
parts of the West Bank, recently announced by the Prime Minister of 
Israel,202 are yet to materialize.  Israeli efforts to integrate parts of the 
West Bank into Israel in the absence of formal annexation, manifest 
in the settlement enterprise, have typically targeted only territories 
outside Palestinian population centers,203 as do plans to formally 
annex parts of the West Bank.204 
 
 199  See G.A. Res. 52/68, ¶ 7 (Feb. 20, 1998), 
https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/52/68 [https://perma.cc/HU4L-H77D] 
(“Reaffirming once more the illegality of the decision of 14 December 1981 taken by 
Israel to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian 
Golan, which has resulted in the effective annexation of that territory.”); G.A. Res. 
51/135, ¶ 7 (Mar. 24, 1997), https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/51/135 
[https://perma.cc/7AKP-VGWE]; Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the 
European Community, Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on Poland 
and Israeli Golan Heights Policy (Dec. 15, 1981), 
http://aei.pitt.edu/5583/1/5583.pdf [https://perma.cc/EGF8-VL6B] 
(maintaining that the extension of Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to the 
Golan Heights is “tantamount to annexation”); Maoz, supra note 176, 384-89 
(reviewing the response of the international community to the application of Israeli 
law, jurisdiction and administration to the Golan Heights, which regarded this 
measure as annexation); BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 205 (noting that the 
international community understood the application by Israel of its laws, 
jurisdiction and administration to East Jerusalem as an attempt to annex East 
Jerusalem). 
 200  The discussion below suggests that a proclamation of annexation that 
remains an empty shell, namely, one that is not accompanied by the occupier’s 
application of its legal and administrative systems to the occupied territory or by 
any other operative measures by which the occupier treats the occupied territory as 
its own, does not amount to annexation for the purpose of the right to citizenship.  
See Part IV.c, infra. 
 201 See Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 2495, 2498; Dajani, supra note 18, at 52; see 
also supra text accompanying notes 18-19. 
 202 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
 203 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 204 See Holmes, supra note 2, and accompanying text. 
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This Part explores two questions.  First, should portions of the 
West Bank be viewed, for the purpose of recognizing the right of 
Palestinian residents of these territories to Israeli citizenship, as part 
of Israel based on a doctrine that extends the concept of annexation 
beyond formal annexation to encompass de facto annexation as well?  
This Part answers this question in the affirmative and advances the 
display of sovereignty test for the existence of annexation, which 
brings together formal annexation and de facto annexation.  This test 
for annexation is satisfied by the occupier’s treatment of the 
occupied territory as its own, namely, the occupier’s continuous 
exercise in the occupied territory of governmental functions that are 
typically reserved to a sovereign.  The most distinct form of such 
display of sovereignty concerns the full extension by the occupier of 
its legal and administrative systems to the occupied territory.  Yet, 
the occupier’s treatment of the occupied territory as its own, which 
satisfies the display of sovereignty test for annexation, may also take 
the form of the settlement by the occupier of its own population 
within the occupied territory, large-scale infrastructure projects 
aimed at supporting such settlement activity, and a partial extension 
of the occupier’s own legal system to the occupied territory. 
Second, may the scope of annexation extend to population 
centers within the occupied territory that are not targeted by the 
occupier’s displays of sovereignty, when the occupier aims to tailor 
its annexation of occupied territory around, and to the exclusion of, 
such population centers to advance a “maximum land, minimum 
population” annexation formula?  This Part shows that a reasonable 
application of the display of sovereignty test for annexation, 
informed by the principle of legality in international law and by the 
right of the people under occupation to self-determination, supports 
recognizing such areas as annexed territory.  This inquiry begins 
with a brief review of Israeli policies promoting the integration of 
parts of the West Bank into Israel. 
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a. The Integration of Occupied Territory into Israel 
i. Facts on the Ground 
Commentators correctly observed that “[t]he story of the 
[Israeli] occupation is inseparable from the settlement enterprise.”205  
Therefore, a review of the factual and legal realities established by 
the settlement enterprise is essential for “identifying the basic 
structure and nature of this occupation regime.” 206   The 
establishment of settlements by Israel in the West Bank began 
shortly after this territory came under Israeli occupation.  At present, 
some 620,000 Israeli settlers reside in settlements and “settlement 
outposts” throughout the occupied West Bank.207  About 210,000 of 
the settlers reside in neighborhoods built by Israel in the expanded 
area of East Jerusalem, and some 410,000 settlers live in 131 
settlements and roughly 110 settlement outposts in other parts of the 
West Bank.208 
The ICJ has observed that the establishment of settlements 
violates Article 49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (“Fourth Geneva 
Convention”), which states that “[t]he Occupying Power shall not 
deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the 
territory it occupies.”209  The Court reasoned that the prohibition 
contained in Article 49 encompasses “not only deportations or 
forced transfers of population . . . but also any measures taken by an 
occupying Power in order to organize or encourage transfers of 
parts of its own population into the occupied territory.”210  Similarly, 
 
 205 Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 579. 
 206 Id. 
 207  Statistics on Settlements and Settler Population, B’TSELEM (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://www.btselem.org/settlements/statistics [https://perma.cc/3FBA-
WM7A]. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter Fourth 
Geneva Convention]; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 120 (July 9). 
 210  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 120 (July 9). 
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the U.N. Security Council has described Israel’s settlement policy as 
a “flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.” 211   The 
settlements enterprise has been criticized as an annexationist 
measure.212 
The settlements are supported by two main infrastructure 
projects cementing their connection to Israel.  The first is a massive 
network of roads connecting the Israeli settlements to each other and 
to Israel, bypassing Palestinian cities and towns, and thereby 
“bringing Israeli territorial contiguity to the West Bank for the first 
time in modern history.”213  Because the bypass roads network is 
closed to Palestinians, it separates Palestinian population centers,214 
dividing the West Bank into numerous non-contiguous zones.215  
Elaborating on the adverse effects of the bypass roads on the 
national aspirations of the Palestinians, Samira Shah observed: 
The bypass road network has devastating effects on 
Palestinian statehood, sovereignty, and self-determination.  
The roads carve up the West Bank, creating enclaves of 
Palestinian authority with definite boundaries.  The roads 
prevent the expansion of these enclaves and ensure that 
there will be no territorial contiguity in the West Bank.  To 
this end, there is a network of roads encircling every major 
Palestinian city.216 
The settlement enterprise is also supported by a barrier 
constructed by Israel within the West Bank (“Barrier”). 217   The 
 
 211 S.C. Res. 465, ¶ 5 (Mar. 1, 1980). 
 212 See Charles F. Martel, Give Peace a Chance: How Considering Peace Process 
Obligations Would Have Improved the Rulings of the International Court of Justice and the 
Israeli Supreme Court on the Israeli Security Barrier, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 305, 
335 (2007) (noting that the settlement enterprise is intended to ensure lasting Israeli 
possession of the West Bank). 
 213 Samira Shah, On the Road to Apartheid: The Bypass Road Network in the West 
Bank, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 221, 264-65 (1997). 
 214 Id. at 223 (observing that the bypass road network serves as “a military grid 
in the West Bank, dividing and surrounding the Palestinian regions with militarily-
controlled roads”). 
 215 GROSS, supra note 140, at 154 (observing that the settlements and the bypass 
roads “have divided the West Bank into some sixty non-contiguous zones”). 
 216 Shah, supra note 213, at 224-25. 
 217  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 79-84 (July 9). 
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Barrier separates the bulk of the West Bank from both Israel proper 
and from portions of the West Bank located between the Barrier and 
the Green Line, which is the line that separates Israel proper from 
the West Bank.218  The construction of the Barrier by Israel began in 
2002, following a wave of terror attacks committed against Israelis 
by Palestinians infiltrating Israel from the West Bank.  The Barrier 
was justified by Israel as a security measure aimed at preventing 
terrorists from entering Israel and Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank that are located in proximity to the Green Line.219  The portions 
of the West Bank located on the Israeli side of the Barrier, between 
the Barrier and the Green Line, are home to most of the Israeli 
settlers as well as to Palestinian communities.220  The Barrier often 
cuts off access by Palestinians on both sides of the Barrier to their 
farmlands.221  It also isolates the Palestinians on the Israeli side of the 
Barrier from the bulk of the West Bank, significantly restricting their 
freedom of movement for purposes of work, trade, enjoyment of 
basic services (e.g., education, healthcare), visiting family and 
friends, and recreation.222 
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (“Wall 
Advisory Opinion”), the ICJ concluded that the construction of the 
Barrier violates a range of humanitarian protections and human 
rights guaranteed to the Palestinian population of the West Bank 
under international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law.223  Noting that the area between the Barrier and the Green 
Line would include most Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and 
that the construction of the Barrier would likely contribute to the 
departure of Palestinians from this area, thereby altering its 
demographic composition,224 the Court also expressed concern that 
the Barrier would facilitate the de facto integration of this area into 
Israel. 225  Commentators have observed that “[t]he settlement 
 
 218 Id. ¶¶ 83-84. 
 219 Id. ¶ 116. 
 220 Id. ¶ 122. 
 221 Id. ¶ 133. 
 222 Id. ¶ 133. 
 223 Id. ¶¶ 123-37. 
 224 Id. ¶ 122. 
 225 Id. ¶ 121. 
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program and the barrier preserving it constitute a deliberately 
comprehensive physical, institutional, and demographic change in 
the status of the West Bank intended to create a political reality too 
difficult to reverse: lasting Israeli possession of contested 
territory.”226 
ii. The Legal System 
The facts on the ground established by the settlement enterprise 
walk hand in hand with the partial application of the Israeli legal 
system to the occupied West Bank.  Aeyal Gross observed: 
Two separate legal systems operate concurrently in the West 
Bank, effectively dividing the population along ethnic lines.  
Jewish settlers are extraterritorially subject to Israeli civilian 
law, whereas the Palestinians are subject to Israeli military 
law and to the local law.  Two main methods were used to 
generate this situation.  The first is the application of Israeli 
law in personam to Jews and Israeli citizens in the OPT 
[occupied Palestinian territories], and the second is the 
partial application of Israeli law, on a supposedly territorial 
basis, to the Jewish settlements in the OPT.227 
The personal application of Israeli law to Israeli settlers in the 
West Bank is secured primarily by Israeli legislation that, for the 
purpose of Israeli statutes applicable to residents of Israel, extends 
the category of Israeli residents to Israeli citizens living in the West 
Bank. 228   This legislation brings Israeli settlers in the West Bank 
within the purview of a wide range of Israeli statutes, including the 
Income Tax Ordinance, the Social Security Law, and the National 
Health Care Law. 229   In addition, Israeli legislation extends the 
jurisdiction of Israeli courts to criminal offences committed by Israeli 
 
 226 Martel, supra note 212, at 335. 
 227 GROSS, supra note 140, at 172; see also, ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR., ONE RULE, 
TWO LEGAL SYSTEMS: ISRAEL’S REGIME OF LAWS IN THE WEST BANK 6 (2014) [hereinafter 
ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR.], https://law.acri.org.il/en/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Two-Systems-of-Law-English-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4E3T-PCDY].  
 228 GROSS, supra note 140, at 172-73. 
 229 Id. at 173. 
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citizens in the West Bank.230  It was observed that “[t]he net result is 
a different set of rights and duties applying to different groups in 
the OPT, along ethnic lines.”231 
The Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) has generally avoided 
extending its legislative jurisdiction to the West Bank on a territorial 
basis. 232   The territorial application of Israeli law to the Israeli 
settlements is secured by military legislation enacted by the Military 
Commander of the West Bank.  Although the Military Commander 
is an Israeli official, he is considered under international law to be 
the governmental authority of the occupied territory, formally 
distinct from the Israeli government.233  The Military Commander 
holds both legislative and administrative powers over the occupied 
 
 230 Id. at 172-73. 
 231 Id. at 173. 
 232  In 2017, the Israeli Knesset enacted the Law for the Regularization of 
Settlement in Judea and Samaria, which represented a direct extension by the 
Knesset of its legislative jurisdiction to the West Bank on a territorial basis.  See Law 
for the Regularization of Settlement in Judea and Samaria, 5777-2017, SH 2064 507 
(Isr.) [hereinafter Regularization Law].  This legislation addressed many cases in 
which Israeli settlements had been established on privately owned Palestinian land.  
The legislation instructed the Military Commander in the West Bank to appropriate 
such land for the purpose of its continued use by Israeli settlers, provided that the 
settlement in question had been established “in good faith” or with the consent of 
the State.  See id. art. 3.  It has been noted that the Regularization Law “is a unique 
case of Knesset legislation that aims to directly regulate property rights over land 
outside of Israel’s jurisdiction.”  See Elena Chachko, Israel’s Settlement Regularization 
Law: the Attorney General’s Extraordinary Brief and What it Means for Israel’s Legal 
Stance on Illegal Settlements, LAWFARE (Dec. 8, 2017, 6:58 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/israels-settlement-regularization-law-attorney-ge
nerals-extraordinary-brief-and-what-it-means [https://perma.cc/UXQ4-TUA2].  
The Regularization Law has been annulled by the Supreme Court of Israel, on the 
grounds that it amounted to an unconstitutional violation of the rights of 
Palestinian land owners to dignity, equality, and property, protected under the 
Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.  See HCJ 1308/17 Silwad 
Municipality v. the Knesset (2020) (Isr.); Tamar Hostovsky Brandes, The Diminishing 
Status of International Law in the Decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court Concerning the 
Occupied Territories, INT’L J. CONST. L. (forthcoming  2020) (on file with author) (“The 
Court circumvented the question of the application of the [Israeli] Basic Laws in the 
Occupied Territories by determining that the Knesset’s authority to legislate is 
restricted by the Basic Laws, regardless of where a law is to take effect . . . .”).  
 233 BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 4 (The law of occupation requires that the 
administration established by the occupier in the occupied territory maintains 
“formal independence of the occupying state.“). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
322 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:1 
   
 
territory, which derive from the international law of occupation 
rather than from Israeli law.234 
Immediately after the West Bank came under Israeli occupation, 
the Military Commander decreed, in accordance with the 
international law of occupation, that the laws existing in the West 
Bank prior to the occupation would remain in effect, subject to 
legislation promulgated by the Military Commander.235  This legal 
regime of pre-occupation law and military legislation ostensibly 
applies to the entire territory of the West Bank, including Israeli 
settlements.  A series of by-laws promulgated by the Military 
Commander, however, apply Israeli laws concerning the operation 
of municipalities and the provision of governmental services within 
Israel to the Israeli settlements in the West Bank.236  These by-laws 
also established Courts of Domestic Affairs, a system of courts that 
serves only the settlements.237  These courts are ostensibly separate 
from the judicial system of Israel, but follow the procedures 
prevailing in Israeli courts.238  The judges of the Courts of Domestic 
Affairs are appointed by the Military Commander from among the 
judges of Israeli courts.239  The military legislation establishing the 
 
 234 Uri Shoham, The Principle of Legality and the Israeli Military Government in 
the Territories, 153 MIL. L. REV. 245, 251 (1996) (“Under customary international law, 
the Military Commander of the occupying forces holds not only the highest 
executive power in the area but also the power to legislate.”); HCJ 7957/04 
Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, 60(2) PD 477, 492 (2005) (Isr.) (noting that the 
Military Commander derives his power from public international law pertaining to 
belligerent occupation). 
 235 BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 212 (citing Proclamation Concerning Law and 
Administration (no. 2) (June 7, 1967), http://nolegalfrontiers.org/military-
orders/mil03c849.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page=&lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/B2C2-JLHJ] (issued by the Military Commander of the West 
Bank)). 
 236 BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 234-36; GROSS, supra note 140, at 174 (noting 
that orders issued by the Military Commander “confer special status on Jewish 
settlements in the [occupied Palestinian territory] by applying to these territorial 
units certain aspects of Israeli law in various spheres, such as education, granting 
them the privileges enjoyed by localities within Israel.”). 
 237 BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 236. 
 238  See HCJ 336/99 Delta Inv. & Com. (Karnei Shomron) Ltd. v. Court of 
Domestic Affs. in Ariel, 55(3) PD 246, 260 (2001) (cited in ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR., 
supra note 227, at 20) (The Supreme Court of Israel noted that one of the purposes 
of establishing the Courts of Domestic Affairs was to achieve “maximal 
equalization between proceedings in the area court [courts in the West Bank serving 
the settlements] and proceedings in courts in Israel.”). 
 239 BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 237. 
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Courts of Domestic Affairs granted them jurisdiction to adjudicate a 
broad range of civil and criminal matters, and provided for the 
application of Israeli laws to the settlements in the fields of welfare 
law, personal status law, education law, health law, labor law, 
agriculture law, condominium law, environmental law, consumer 
protection and commerce law, communications law, and religion 
laws.240 
Eyal Benvenisti observed that:  
 
The enactments of the military authorities created a special 
legal system in the settlements, a system that adopted Israeli 
law, administration, and jurisdiction while at the same time 
excluding them from otherwise applicable local laws . . . . 
[T]he by-laws created in the settlements a legal environment 
similar to that found within Israel.241   
 
Commentators have observed that the partial application of 
Israeli law to the West Bank has blurred the boundaries between 
Israel and the West Bank, transforming the status of the latter from 
“escrow” held in trust by the occupier to legal “mongrel,” as the 
occupied territories “have gradually been incorporated in practice 
into the realm of Israel’s rule.”242 
 
 240 Id. at 236; ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR., supra note 227, at 20-21. 
 241 BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 235-36 (observing further that “[t]he municipal 
regime of the settlements enacted by the by-laws was fashioned according to the 
Israeli municipal system.  Many provisions in the by-laws explicitly incorporated 
Israeli primary and secondary legislation, including provisions relating to planning 
and building and to licensing of businesses.”). 
 242 Amnon Rubinstein, The Changing Status of the “Territories” (West Bank and 
Gaza): From Escrow to Legal Mongrel, 8 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 59, 67, 79 (1988); see also 
Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 586.  Tamar Hostovsky Brandes 
argues that the jurisprudence of the Israeli Supreme Court has contributed to the 
“creeping annexation” of the West Bank.  Hostovsky Brandes, supra note 232, at 2.  
Hostovsky Brandes commented on the judicial review exercised by the Supreme 
Court over the actions of Israeli authorities with regard to the West Bank, observing 
that “while the international law of occupation still operates, officially, as the 
governing normative framework in the Occupied Territories, . . . the Court has 
increased its reliance on Israeli administrative law, and, in recent years, also on 
Israeli constitutional law.  As a result, the distinction between the Occupied 
Territories and Israel is blurred.”  Id.  
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b. The Parameters of de facto Annexation 
Discussion by courts and commentators of the existence of 
annexation beyond situations of formal annexation has revolved 
around the notion of de facto annexation. 243   This discussion 
addressed de facto annexation as a concept that denotes, in the same 
way that formal annexation does, a violation by the occupier of the 
prohibition against the use of force or of the right of the people 
under occupation to self-determination.244  Attempts to define de 
facto annexation have also concerned the significance of this form of 
annexation as a parameter of the illegality of occupation.245  This 
discussion reveals three possible tests for the existence of de facto 
annexation. 
i. The Purpose-Based Test for Annexation 
The purpose-based test for de facto annexation assumes that the 
conduct of an occupier that falls short of a formal act of annexation, 
but nevertheless attests to the occupier’s “intention to hold the 
territory permanently under its dominion,”246 must be considered as 
 
 243 Infra notes 244-245. 
 244  BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 245, 349 (noting that de facto annexation 
amounts to aggression); Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 553-56, 592, 
597-605 (inferring from the right of peoples to self-determination and from the 
principle regarding the inalienability of sovereignty through the use of force a 
“reasonable time” limit on the duration of occupation, and arguing that de facto 
annexation marks a violation of this norm); Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 2472-76, 
2494-98 (addressing possible tests for the existence of de facto annexation, and noting 
that such annexation implicates the norm concerning the inadmissibility of the 
acquisition of territory by war); Dajani, supra note 18, at 51 (asking whether conduct 
that amounts to de facto annexation “rise[s] beyond a violation of the jus in bello to 
contravene the jus ad bellum”); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 184 (July 9) 
(noting that actions by Israel that may result in the de facto annexation of parts of 
the West Bank violate the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination). 
 245 Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 7, at 601-05. 
 246  Dajani, supra note 18, at 52 (noting that traditional international law 
considered annexation to have occurred whenever a conquering state that had 
gained “effective possession” of the territory in question clearly manifested its 
“intention to hold the territory permanently under its dominion”); see also COLEMAN 
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a form of annexation.  This approach takes into account a broad 
range of conduct on the part of the occupier that reveals 
annexationist intentions.  Such conduct may include the refusal by 
the occupier to engage in good faith negotiations aimed at ending 
the occupation, statements by officials of the occupying state that do 
not amount to formal annexation but indicate that the occupier 
considers the occupied territory its own, legal measures that 
partially apply the laws and administration of the occupying state 
to the occupied territory, and the establishment by the occupier of 
facts on the ground that contribute to the integration of the occupied 
territory into the territory of the occupier.  It has thus been argued 
that the vast settlement enterprise conducted by Israel in the West 
Bank, the infrastructure facilitating the integration of the settlements 
into Israel, 247  statements made by Israeli officials regarding the 
political purpose of the settlements and of the Barrier, and the partial 
application by Israel of its laws to the occupied territories reveal a 
political purpose of perpetuating Israel’s possession of parts of the 
West Bank.248  It has been argued that the intention revealed by the 
conduct of Israel meets the test for de facto annexation.249 
 
PHILLIPSON, TERMINATION OF WAR AND TREATIES OF PEACE 9 (1916) (cited in Dajani, 
supra note 18, at 52). 
 247 See supra notes 213-222 and accompanying text (discussing the road system 
connecting the settlements to Israel and the Barrier separating most settlements 
from other parts of the West Bank). 
 248 See Martel, supra note 212, at 335; Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 
7, at 601 (inferring from Israel’s actions in the West Bank “an intention to retain its 
presence there indefinitely”); John Dugard (Special Rapporteur of the Commission 
on Human Rights), Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab 
Territories, Including Palestine, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/6 (Sept. 8, 2003) 
[hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur] (“[T]he construction of the Wall 
within the West Bank and the continued expansion of settlements, which, on the 
face of it, have more to do with territorial expansion, de facto annexation or 
conquest, raise serious doubts about the good faith of Israel’s justifications in the 
name of security.”); David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of 
International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L. L. 88, 92 (2005) (“The debate in Israel 
clearly demonstrates that the government did indeed have political intentions in 
setting the barrier’s route.”); Dajani, supra note 18, at 54 (arguing that Israel’s actions 
in the West Bank are probative of annexationist intent). 
 249  Dajani, supra note 18, at 55 (submitting that, in view of annexationist 
intentions demonstrated by Israel through its actions in the West Bank and the 
position taken by Israeli negotiators, “the international community need not wait 
for a formal act of annexation to consider that it has occurred”); Report of the 
Special Rapporteur, supra note 248, at ¶ 6 (“[T]he fact must be faced that what we 
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Examining the lawfulness under international law of the 
construction of the Barrier, the Supreme Court of Israel rejected the 
view that this measure revealed an annexationist intention on the 
part of Israel. 250   The Court acknowledged that “the Military 
Commander is not authorized to order the construction of the 
separation fence if his reasons are political.  The purpose of the 
separation fence cannot be the ‘annexation’ of territories [of the West 
Bank] to the State of Israel.  The purpose of the separation fence 
cannot be to draw a political border.”251  The Court proceeded to 
conclude, however, that the construction of the Barrier was not 
motivated by a political purpose of shaping the borders of Israel, but 
rather by the security interest in preventing the infiltration of 
terrorists into Israel and into the Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank.252  The Court did not consider whether the establishment by 
Israel of settlements in the West Bank and the partial application of 
Israeli law to the West Bank reveal an annexationist intention.  
Rather, the Court addressed the construction of the Barrier in 
isolation from other measures taken by Israel that facilitate the 
integration of parts of the West Bank into Israel, considering the 
settlements only as the premise of the security argument for the 
incursion of the Barrier into the West Bank.253 
A review of the legal literature reveals nuanced approaches to 
the application of the purpose-based test for de facto annexation.  
According to one approach, the required intention on the part of the 
occupier must be “to take territory in perpetuity . . .  to take 
sovereignty.”254  I term this approach the “narrow purpose-based 
test for annexation.”  The second approach extends the definition of 
annexation to any significant prolongation by the occupier of the 
occupation that is contrary to international law.  Such an approach 
 
are presently witnessing in the West Bank is a visible and clear act of territorial 
annexation under the guise of security.”); Ben-Naftali, Gross & Michaeli, supra note 
7, at 601-05 (concluding that the actions of Israel in the West Bank amount to de facto 
annexation because they reveal an intention on the part of Israel to retain its 
presence in this territory indefinitely). 
 250 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov’t of Isr., 43 ILM 1099, 1108 
(2004) (Isr.). 
 251 Id.  
 252 Id.  at 1109. 
 253 Id.  
 254 Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 2472. 
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measures the existence of de facto annexation based on the range of 
interests that an occupier may legitimately promote by maintaining 
the occupation and negotiating its termination, which many 
commentators view to be limited to reasonable security 
considerations.255  An occupied territory is considered to have been 
annexed if the occupier prolongs the occupation to advance interests 
that exceed this range of legitimate interests, even if an intention to 
take the territory in perpetuity cannot be established.  I term this 
approach the “broad purpose-based test for annexation.”  Applying 
this approach, Eyal Benvenisti observed that the occupier has a duty 
under international law to negotiate in good faith a peaceful solution 
ending the occupation, and that “the failure to do so should be 
considered outright annexation,” 256  in violation of international 
law. 257  Benvenisti asserted that the conduct of good faith 
negotiations requires the occupier to limit the conditions it presents 
for ending the occupation to “reasonable security interests,”258 and 
implied that such interests are restricted to those security objectives 
that a state may promote in a war of self-defense.259 
Under the broad purpose-based test for annexation, Israel could 
be viewed to have annexed a given area of the West Bank if it uses 
the occupation of that area as a bargaining chip to extract Palestinian 
territorial concessions with regard to other parts of the West Bank.  
Annexation would also result under this approach if Israel uses the 
occupation to extract a Palestinian concession with regard to the 
 
 255 See BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 245-46 (“[N]o . . . claim of illegality would 
be proper as long as the occupant’s conditions for peaceful settlement of the conflict 
are motivated by reasonable security interests.”); CASSESE, supra note 26, at 55 
(arguing that an occupier may not maintain the occupation unless “it is justified by 
Article 51 of the UN Charter [i.e., the self-defense exception to the prohibition on 
the use of force] and, therefore, being restricted to the need to repel an act of 
aggression, is limited in duration”); see also Stephen M. Schwebel, Editorial 
Comment, What Weight to Conquest?, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 344, 345-46 (1970) (“A state 
acting in lawful exercise of its right of self-defense may seize and occupy foreign 
territory as long as such seizure and occupation are necessary to its self-defense. . . .  
As a condition of its withdrawal from such territory, that state may require the 
institution of security measures reasonably designed to ensure that that territory 
shall not again be used to mount a threat or use of force against it of such a nature 
as to justify exercise of self-defense.”). 
 256 BENVENISTI, supra note 26, at 245. 
 257 Id. at 245, 349. 
 258 Id. at 246. 
 259 Id. at 17. 
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claim of the Palestinians to a right of return of Palestinian refugees 
to the territory of Israel proper; to advance any other political 
interest transcending security considerations; or to promote security 
interests that exceed the limits of the right to self-defense. 
ii. The Effects-Based Test for Annexation 
The second test for de facto annexation is effects-based.  This test 
was adopted by the ICJ in the Wall Advisory Opinion.  The Court 
addressed the question of de facto annexation in considering whether 
the construction of the Barrier in the West Bank violated the right of 
the Palestinian people to self-determination.260  The government of 
Israel assured the Court that the Barrier was not intended as an 
instrument of annexation, but rather “solely as a temporary, 
nonviolent defensive measure to guard against suicide and other 
attacks against Israel and Israelis.”261  The ICJ noted the assurance 
provided by Israel regarding the purpose of the Barrier, leaving it 
unchallenged without any further evaluation of its credibility.262  
The ICJ also refrained from examining whether the settlement 
enterprise and the legal regime applied by Israel to the settlements 
and to the settlers reveal an annexationist intention on the part of 
Israel, which meets the purpose-based test for de facto annexation.  
Noting, however, that the area between the Barrier and the Green 
Line would include most Israeli settlements illegally established in 
the West Bank, and that the construction of the Barrier would likely 
 
 260  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 122 (July 9). 
 261  Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction and 
Propriety ¶ 1.8, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 122 (July 9), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/131/1579.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MP6J-24L8]. 
 262 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 121 (July 9); see also 
Kretzmer, supra note 248, at 92 (noting that the ICJ refrained from contesting Israel’s 
assurance that the Barrier is not an instrument of annexation “probably because it 
did not have the evidentiary basis to do so”). 
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contribute to the departure of Palestinians from this area, changing 
its demographic composition,263 the Court proceeded to state: 
[The Court] cannot remain indifferent to certain fears 
expressed to it that the route of the wall will prejudge the 
future frontier between Israel and Palestine, and the fear that 
Israel may integrate the settlements and their means of 
access.  The Court considers that the construction of the wall 
and its associated régime create a “fait accompli” on the 
ground that could well become permanent, in which case, 
and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall 
by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto annexation.264 
Joshua Kleinfeld observed that: 
 
This is essentially an effects-based test for annexation; the 
suggestion is that the Barrier might change facts on the 
ground (demographics, for example, as Israelis move into 
and Palestinians move out of the West Bank land on the 
Israeli side of the Barrier) in such a way as to make a 
restoration of the Green Line untenable in the future.265  
 
The effects-based test hinges upon the identification of the point of 
no return, which marks a factual integration of the occupied 
territory into the occupying state, which is so entrenched that it 
cannot be reversed. 
Applying the effects-based test, the ICJ appears to have been 
unconvinced that the integration of parts of the West Bank into 
Israel, resulting from Israeli policies, has reached the point of no 
return.  The Court stopped short of determining that the 
construction of the Barrier, considered together with the settlement 
enterprise, currently amount to de facto annexation.  Rather, the 
Court observed that the Barrier has the potential of becoming a 
permanent, irreversible reality, “in which case . . . it would be 
tantamount to de facto annexation.”266  The Court took the view that 
 
 263 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 122 (July 9). 
 264 Id. ¶ 121. 
 265 Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 2474-75. 
 266  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 121 (July 9). 
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the possibility that the Barrier becomes a permanent reality in the 
future suffices to conclude that its construction violates the right of 
the Palestinian people to self-determination.267 
iii. The Display of Sovereignty Test for Annexation 
ICJ Judge Koroma, concurring with the Wall Advisory Opinion 
of the Court, took the view that “the construction of the wall has 
involved the annexation of parts of the occupied territory by Israel, 
the occupying Power, contrary to the fundamental international law 
principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force.” 268   Judge 
Koroma reasoned that by building the wall inside the occupied 
Palestinian territories, Israel has “embark[ed] there on activities of a 
sovereign nature which will change their status as occupied 
territory.”269  This approach, equating annexation with “activities of 
a sovereign nature” on the part of the occupier, suggests a test for 
the existence of annexation that brings together formal and de facto 
annexation.  This test for annexation, which I term the display of 
sovereignty test, requires the occupier’s continuous exercise in the 
occupied territory of governmental functions that are typically 
reserved to a sovereign. 
The display of sovereignty test is naturally satisfied by formal 
annexation, namely, the full extension by the occupier of its legal 
and administrative systems to the occupied territory. 270   Yet, 
activities of a sovereign nature, which satisfy the display of 
sovereignty test for annexation, may also take the form of the 
settlement by the occupier of its own population in the occupied 
territory, substantial infrastructure projects aimed at supporting 
 
 267 Id. ¶ 122. 
 268  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma, 2004 
I.C.J. 136, ¶ 2 (July 9).  
 269 Id. 
 270 See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text. 
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such settlement activity, and a partial extension of the occupier’s 
legal system to the occupied territory. 271 
Advancement by the occupier of the purpose of holding the 
territory in perpetuity typically entails conduct that amounts to the 
display of sovereignty. 272   The distinction between the narrow 
purpose-based test for annexation, which requires an intention to 
hold the territory in perpetuity and the display of sovereignty test is 
therefore of little practical significance. 
By contrast, the distinction between the display of sovereignty 
test and the broad purpose-based test for annexation seems 
significant.  An occupier could conceivably prolong the occupation 
significantly by using it as a bargaining chip to advance illegitimate 
interests, conduct that amounts to de facto annexation under the 
broad purpose-based test, while otherwise complying with a range 
of international humanitarian law provisions that prohibit an 
occupier from actions amounting to the display of sovereignty.273  
The display of sovereignty test for de facto annexation is also distinct 
from the effects-based test, as the display of sovereignty by the 
occupier does not necessarily result in permanent, irreversible 
integration of the occupied territory into the occupying state. 
 
 271 GROSS, supra note 140, at 172 (“Israel’s establishment of settlements in the 
[occupied Palestinian territory], together with the application of Israeli law to the 
settlements and their residents, are more an exercise of sovereignty than of 
occupation.”); id. at 176 (“Israel acts in the [occupied Palestinian territory] as a 
sovereign insofar as it settles its citizens there and extends to them its laws on a 
personal and on a mixed personal/territorial basis.”). 
 272 Dajani, supra note 18, at 53 (applying the purpose-based test for annexation, 
Dajani notes that a state’s “intention to hold a territory ‘under its dominion,’ . . .  
may be signaled by a state’s exercise, for a prolonged time, of the kinds of 
governmental functions typically reserved to a sovereign.”). 
 273 Examples of such humanitarian law prohibitions include Article 49(6) of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the occupying state from settling 
its own population within the occupied territory, and Article 64 of the Convention, 
which limits the liberty of the occupier to legislate for the occupied territory.  See 
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 209, arts. 49, 64. 
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c. The Proposed Test for Annexation for the Purpose of the Right to 
Citizenship 
This Article proposes the application of the display of 
sovereignty test for annexation in determining whether West Bank 
Palestinians have a right to Israeli citizenship.  According to this 
view, the prolongation of the occupation, even if linked to 
annexationist intentions of the occupier, does not in itself amount to 
annexation.  The parameters of annexation consist in, and are 
limited to, actions by the occupier, both in the form of legal measures 
and in the establishment of facts on the ground, which bear the 
distinguishing mark of sovereignty. 
Part III has shown that applying the norms of IHRL on 
citizenship to the relationship between the residents of an illegally 
annexed territory and the annexing state requires an exception to the 
principle that illegal annexation has no legal effect.  The ILC 
concluded, relying on IHRL, that situations of state succession, 
including the lawful annexation of territory by the successor state, 
give rise to a right of the residents of the territory in question to 
receive the citizenship of the successor state, but excluded situations 
of illegal annexation from the scope of its analysis.274  According to 
the argument for extending the norms of IHRL on citizenship also 
to the illegal annexation of territory by an occupier, the reality facing 
the residents of an annexed territory, and therefore their interests in 
obtaining the citizenship of the annexing state, are similar in the case 
of both legal and illegal annexation.  This argument informs the 
appropriate test for the existence of illegal annexation. 
For the purpose of the right to citizenship, the concept of illegal 
annexation denotes a factual reality that resembles the one that 
typically emanates from the lawful acquisition of a territory by a 
state.  Determining the existence of illegal annexation by the 
occupier reflects the recognition that the occupied territory has 
become, in reality, a part of the occupying state, and that the 
residents of that territory are therefore entitled to receive the 
citizenship of the occupying state in the same way that residents of 
a territory that has been lawfully acquired by a state are entitled to 
its citizenship.  Pronouncing the existence of illegal annexation 
 
 274 See supra notes 85-91, 168-171 and accompanying text. 
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conveys that the former are on a par with the latter when it comes to 
the right to citizenship because of the similarity between the factual 
realities.  This function of the concept of illegal annexation ties the 
existence of annexation to the occupier’s treatment of the occupied 
territory as its own, and therefore points to the display of 
sovereignty test for annexation. 
The display of sovereignty test for annexation is a factual test, 
but its application may be informed by normative considerations.  A 
strict application of the display of sovereignty test would preclude 
extending the scope of annexation to portions of an occupied 
territory that are not the object of the occupier’s annexationist 
policies.  There is, however, a strong normative argument against 
allowing an occupier to pick and choose small, densely populated 
areas within the occupied territory that the occupier would exclude 
from the realm of annexation and thereby from the sway of the right 
to citizenship.  This argument concerns both the principle of legality 
in international law and the right to self-determination. 
Annexation of occupied territory violates jus cogens and is 
considered under international law to be null and void.275  Attaching 
to such annexation legal consequences that extend as far as 
citizenship, which is the distinguishing mark of the relationship 
between individuals and their state, erodes the political force of this 
legal principle and implicitly indicates a degree of recognition by 
international law of the validity of the illegal annexation.  This exacts 
a toll on the principle of legality in international law.  A theory that 
derives a right of West Bank Palestinians to Israeli citizenship from 
the annexation of occupied territories by Israel accepts such costs.  It 
seems, however, that the principle of legality would be further 
harmed if the occupier were allowed to tailor an “illegal annexation 
bargain” that is most favorable to it with respect to the legal and 
political consequences of annexation.  This would be the case if the 
occupier were allowed to draw, applying a “maximum land, 
minimum population” formula, the boundaries of the illegally 
annexed territory whose residents are entitled to the occupier’s 
citizenship, and with regard to which a sovereignty claim by the 
occupier would gain political strength. 
Granting legal effect, insofar as citizenship rights are concerned, 
to efforts on the part of Israel to design the annexation so that it 
 
 275 See sources cited supra notes 140-145. 
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encompasses as much territory and as little of the population as 
possible would greatly facilitate and benefit such efforts.  The 
application by Israel of such annexation policy may diminish the 
capacity of the Palestinian people to exercise its right to self-
determination in the form of statehood to the point where 
Palestinians are completely divested of that right.  An international 
stance that benefits such policy, leaving most Palestinians without 
an alternative option of realizing the right to self-determination 
through the exercise of Israeli citizenship rights, would be 
detrimental to the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination. 
When the geographic spread of displays of sovereignty by the 
occupier resembles a thick web, viewing the entire occupied 
territory covered by that web, including the “holes” in which the 
occupier does not act as a sovereign, as subject to annexation does 
not seem a significant stretch of the display of sovereignty test for 
annexation.  Similarly, the greater the geographic proximity 
between (a) areas within the occupied territory that are subject to 
displays of sovereignty by the occupier and (b) other occupied areas 
in which the occupier did not act as a sovereign, the more plausible 
it is to consider the latter to have been annexed under the display of 
sovereignty test. 
As noted above, settlement activity by the occupier is a form of 
display of sovereignty that contributes significantly to the existence 
of annexation.  Currently, over two hundred Israeli settlements and 
settlement outposts are spread across the entire West Bank. 276 
Considering the small size of the West Bank (approximately 2,180 
square miles),277 it is clear that the settlements, the infrastructure 
supporting them, and the legal regime applied by Israel to the 
settlements form a thick web of displays of sovereignty on the part 
of Israel throughout the West Bank.  Therefore, a reasonable 
application of the display of sovereignty test, which is based on the 
current map of settlements and is informed by the normative 
interest in preventing the tailoring by the occupier of a “maximum 
land, minimum population” annexation map, would result in the 
 
 276 See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text. 
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entire West Bank being considered to have been annexed.  This 
result would allow all West Bank Palestinians to claim a right to 
Israeli citizenship based on the emerging right to citizenship in 
customary IHRL. 
Given the small size of the West Bank, a distribution of 
settlements that avoids the annexation of the entire West Bank under 
the display of sovereignty test would have to be confined to the 
margins of this territory, requiring the removal of a large number of 
settlements.  Settlements located at the margins of the West Bank 
would not color the entire West Bank as annexed territory, but 
would bring into the realm of annexation any Palestinian city, town, 
or village in their vicinity that is located between two settlements or 
between an Israeli settlement and the territory of Israel proper, 
defined by the Green Line. 
The above discussion suggests that, in view of the current map 
of settlements, the formal annexation planned by Israel would not 
have a transformative effect on the status of the West Bank.  Even in 
the absence of formal annexation, the settlement enterprise satisfies 
the display of sovereignty test for annexation with regard to the 
entire West Bank. 
The application of the proposed test for annexation must take 
into account the devastating effect that granting Israeli citizenship 
to all or most West Bank Palestinians would have on the character 
of Israel as a Jewish state.  The next section addresses the tension 
between the interest in Israel maintaining such character and the 
emerging right of West Bank Palestinians to Israeli citizenship and 
discusses the legal consequences of such tension for the application 
of the proposed test for annexation. 
d. The Annexation of West Bank Territories and the Character of Israel 
as a Jewish State 
The existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish state has been 
justified as the expression of the right of the Jewish people to self-
determination. 278   The view that a Jewish state is a proper 
manifestation of the right of the Jewish people to self-determination 
 
 278 Frances Raday, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, 26 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 453, 470 (2003). 
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relies primarily on an argument that is analogous with affirmative 
action theory.279  It has been noted that “affirmative action policies 
are routinely justified on the basis of compensation for past 
discrimination,” 280  and that this justification “work[s] well in 
defense of a Jewish state.  In terms of historical discrimination, 
Justice Frankfurter’s observation that the Jews represent ‘the most 
vilified and persecuted minority in history’ can hardly be denied.”281  
Elaborating on the strength of the right of the Jewish people to self-
determination in the form of a Jewish state, Frances Raday observed: 
The Jewish claim to self-determination is based on the 
desperate need to correct historic wrongs on a global scale, 
resulting from persecution and discrimination by a majority 
of host States over nearly two thousand years of history and 
culminating in the Holocaust in Europe in the twentieth 
century.  It is, arguably, the only case of a claim to self-
determination in rem, as it might be termed, against the entire 
world.282 
The character of Israel as a Jewish state hinges on the retention 
of a solid Jewish majority among citizens of the country, which 
would not be possible if the bulk of the Palestinian population of the 
West Bank were granted Israeli citizenship.283  This does not justify 
the type of ethnic oppression manifested in the denial of citizenship 
to non-Jewish residents of territory annexed by Israel, either 
formally or de facto.  Reliance on the right of the Jewish people to 
self-determination cannot pave the way to a legal regime whose 
hallmark is the rule of one ethnic group over another through the 
discriminatory denial of citizenship rights, which would bear 
resemblance to an apartheid regime. 
 
 279 See Zasloff, supra note 80, at 208. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. at 209. 
 282 Raday, supra note 278, at 462. 
 283 Id. at 470 (“The Israeli government is not and cannot become sovereign 
over the entire Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza without forfeiting 
the expression of its own self-determination.  The basis for Israeli Statehood has 
been and continues to be the right of the Jewish people to self-determination.  For 
this to be feasible, the State of Israel must have a majority of Jews in the population 
and hence, the government.”) 
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I argue, however, that the legal significance of the right of the 
Jewish people to self-determination justifies allowing Israel a 
reasonable time period to secure its Jewish character in a manner 
that is consistent with the emerging right to citizenship and its 
application to cases of annexation.  There is strong precedent in 
constitutional and administrative law of various jurisdictions for 
allowing the state a reasonable adjustment period where an 
immediate application of the law stated by the courts would be 
detrimental to a legitimate interest of the state or to individual 
interests.  Domestic courts enunciating the unconstitutionality of 
legislation often postpone its nullification for an adjustment period 
during which the legislator can determine how to remedy the 
constitutional flaw.284  Such postponement was deemed necessary to 
prevent a “legislative void” that would compromise an essential 
public interest.285  For similar reasons, domestic courts pronouncing 
the unlawfulness of administrative rules have increasingly turned to 
the practice of remanding such rules without vacating them, which 
allows the administrative agency to continue to implement the rule 
as it works to amend the flaws underlying its unlawfulness.286 
International law requires a state in violation of an international 
law obligation to cease such violation immediately and 
unconditionally.287  In view of the innovative nature of the proposed 
legal construction that would entitle the Palestinians to Israeli 
citizenship based on unlawful, de facto annexation, it is possible, 
 
 284 See Schachter v. Can. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (Can.); HCJ 1715/97 Chamber of 
Inv. Managers in Isr. v. Minister of Fin., 51(4) PD 367, 417 (1997); see also Saliternik, 
supra note 161, at 1281. 
 285  Schachter, 2 S.C.R. at 715 (“A Court may strike down legislation or a 
legislative provision but suspend the effect of that declaration until Parliament . . . 
has had an opportunity to fill the void.  This approach is clearly appropriate where 
striking down of a provision poses a potential danger to the public . . . or otherwise 
threatens the rule of law . . . .”); Chamber of Inv. Managers in Isr., supra note 284, 
51(4) PD at 417.  
 286 Saliternik, supra note 161, at 1270-1272 (reviewing such decisions by U.S. 
courts). 
 287  Olivier Corten, The Obligation of Cessation, in THE LAW OF INT'L 
RESPONSIBILITY 545, 548 (James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson eds., 2010) 
(“In law, a State must and can always put an end to a continuing breach [of 
international law].”); Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 146, at 88, 
art. 30 (stipulating that a state “responsible for internationally wrongful conduct is 
under an obligation” to cease such conduct, if it is continuing, without recognizing 
the possibility of a permissible delay in the performance of this obligation). 
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however, to construe the obligation of Israel to grant such 
citizenship as one that will have consolidated only after the passage 
of a reasonable adjustment period, which allows Israel to narrow the 
scope of annexation through the removal of settlements. 
It would fall to the international community of states to 
determine, in view of the future conduct of Israel, what amounts to 
a reasonable adjustment period.  Matthew Waxman has observed 
that “[f]or the most part . . . application and enforcement of 
international law are decentralized, occur outside formal 
international institutions, and remain largely the province of 
states.”288 Because states are the primary compliance agents with 
regard to international law, the content of a state’s obligations under 
international law depends on the views of other states.  As noted by 
Andrew Guzman and Timothy Meyer, “obligations are, to a large 
extent, in the eye of the beholder.  In a legal system in which 
enforcement relies on self-help by the law’s subjects, those subjects’ 
perceptions as to what an obligation requires effectively define the 
obligation.” 289  Presumably, an ICJ Advisory Opinion construing 
what amounts to a “reasonable adjustment period” would carry 
considerable weight in forging the views of the international 
community of states on this matter. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The annexationist policies of Israel in the occupied West Bank 
give rise to flagrant discrimination between the population of Israel 
and the Palestinian population of the West Bank, which has the 
distinguishing marks of a colonial regime.  Such discrimination is 
the result of the denial of Israeli citizenship to West Bank 
Palestinians, and of Israel treating the occupied territory as its own, 
without assuming in relation to the local population the duties that 
a sovereign has toward its nationals. 
This Article has explored a path in international law for 
recognizing the right of the Palestinian population of the West Bank 
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to Israeli citizenship.  The Article showed that, to the extent that 
Israel is deemed to have annexed a given area of the West Bank, it is 
required under treaty law to grant its citizenship to many of the 
Palestinian residents of such territory.  Moreover, emerging norms 
of customary international law would require Israel to grant its 
citizenship to all Palestinians residing in an area of the West Bank 
annexed by Israel. 
The Article argued further that the enterprise of Israeli 
settlements across the West Bank amounts to annexation, which 
currently extends to the entire territory of the West Bank.  Hence, 
unless Israel narrows the scope of annexation, within a reasonable 
time period, by removing many of the settlements, Israel’s 
obligations under existing and emerging norms of IHRL concerning 
the right to citizenship would apply to the relationship between 
Israel and all West Bank Palestinians. 
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